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The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control 
 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
 
 






Constitutional scholarship is preoccupied with questions of how 
state power should be constrained. The Constitution, however, not 
only sets bounds to state action, it also structures the range of 
policy options and the rules for making legally effective choices. 
This Article analyzes the ensuing constitutional law of agenda 
control, focusing on the distribution of such powers between the 
three federal branches. This analysis generates two central claims. 
First, the Framers incorporated an array of heterogeneous agenda 
control devices across the three branches in order to calibrate 
intragovernmental relations. These make up a hitherto ignored 
constitutional law of agenda control. Second, a surprising number 
of these constitutional agenda-setting rules have been ignored or 
even circumvented. Political actors have tended to negotiate 
alternate distributions of agenda control power at odds with the 
original constitutional design. While the ensuing transformation of 
the constitutional processes for governance has ambiguous 
distributive consequences, there is reason to treat the historical 
transformation of constitutional agenda control as on balance a 
desirable development.  
                                                            
* Professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Kent Barnett, Saul Levmore, and 
Nick Stephanopoulos for helpful conversations and comments. All errors are mine alone.  
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The ordinary diet of constitutional adjudication is dominated by questions 
about state actors’ powers. Can Congress, the Justices ask, regulate certain private 
conduct 1 or direct the president’s diplomatic decisions?2 What sort of cases must 
Article III forums decide?3 When can the president make recess appointments4 or 
preempt state-law procedural rules in the national interest? 5  The resulting 
jurisprudence maps limits to government’s ability to act. Constitutional law, to 
judge by the case reporters, involves the mapping of institutional limits. 
 
This story is incomplete. There is more to constitutional design than 
jealous titration of state power via prohibitory injunctions. This Article 
investigates a hitherto unexplored domain of constitutional design—the 
constitutional law of agenda control.6 Its central premise is that constitutional 
rules do not merely prohibit state action, but also shape how decisions are made. 
For example, the Court’s judgment in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry is 
superficially a decision about whether the president or Congress determines what 
gets printed in U.S. passports.7 More profoundly, it is a dispute about which 
branch sets the foreign policy agenda. Similarly, NLRB v. Noel Canning directly 
concerns the president’s recess appointment authority, but also allocates power 
both initiate or block regulatory agendas between the branches.8 Agenda control 
in the federal courts is also a matter of explicit disagreement. The dissenters in 
Obergefell v. Hodges perceived an improper effort by “five unelected Justices” to 
                                                            
1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For a more recent 
reaffirmation of the principle of limited enumerated powers principle, see Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]o be ‘made in Pursuance’ of the 
Constitution, a law must fall within one of Congress' enumerated powers and be promulgated in 
accordance with the lawmaking procedures set forth in that document.”). 
2 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (invalidating 
congressional regulation of U.S. passports’ content as inconsistent with a presidential “recognition 
power”). 
3 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) (allowing consent-based 
adjudication of certain state-law claims in bankruptcy court); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 
2594 (2011) (holding that Article III limits non-Article III delegations).  
4 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
5 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (holding that the President lacks authority to 
delay Texas executions based on an International Court of Justice judgment). 
6 I use the terms agenda control and agenda setting interchangeably in this Article.  
7 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). 
8 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2550 
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foist “their personal vision of liberty upon the American people.” 9  In 
contemporaneous cases, though, those same Justices invited litigants to raise 
previously dormant constitutional challenges—in effect seeking to shape the 
Court’s agenda themselves.10 
 
I advance two main claims about agenda-control rules. First, one of the 
Constitution’s original functions was to structure how state actors selected among 
issues and picked among potential policy responses. The ensuing rules for agenda 
control are distinct from more familiar constitutional limitations on state action, 
yet still aim to shape the epistemic and strategic environment of democratic 
governance. Second, the Framers’ original allocation of agenda setting power has 
not fared well (perhaps explaining its relative neglect by scholars). Interbranch 
negotiation and bargaining has led to some agenda control rules being ignored, 
even as others are circumvented. As a result, the distribution of agenda-control 
powers has drifted far from the arrangement envisaged in 1787.  
 
Let me unpack each of these points in turn. My first task, given the scant 
academic attention hitherto paid to agenda control rules,11 is descriptive and 
                                                            
9 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing 
the Obergefell majority of staking “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-
legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government”).  
10 In particular, Justice Thomas issued a series of striking concurrences in the 2014 Term that 
flagged previously dormant constitutional issues in ways that de facto invite litigants to file future 
challenges. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (noting “doubts about 
the legitimacy of this Court's precedents concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Natural Gas 
Act,” and in effect flagging the issue for future challenge); Dep’t of Transp’n v. Ass’n of Am. 
Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-41 (2015) (calling into question the permissible scope of 
legislative guidance and purporting to “identify principles relevant to today's dispute, with an eye 
to offering guidance to the lower courts on remand”); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling into question “the 
legitimacy of our precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations,” 
including Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)). 
11 A few legal scholars have identified piecemeal some of the agenda setting mechanisms 
discussed here. For example, Saul Levmore has offered an influential account of bicameralism as a 
solution to incoherence in collective choice and an important analysis of the interaction between 
interest-group activity and agenda-setting mechanisms. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and 
Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 260-61 (1999) (identifying a “link between instability 
and [interest group] activity” such that interest groups “will then invest in order to influence … 
procedural rules or, what is sometimes the same thing, the agenda setter”). William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn have drawn attention to the way in which lawmaking is “dynamic interaction 
between the preferences of the House and Senate (bicameralism) and the President (presentment).” 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528 
(1992). In subsequently work, Eskridge has extended the analysis to congressional committees. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–
48 (2008) (describing opportunities for House or Senate members to derail proposed legislation at 
“veto-gates,” i.e. necessary stages in the legislative process where one group or another has the 
ability to derail a bill). They build on a political-science literature on “veto-gates”—a kind of 
concurrence power, in my argot—upon the available range of policy outcomes. See George 
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conceptual. Constitutional scholars need a vocabulary to discuss the large domain 
of agenda control rules. To that end, I map out the agenda control rules found in 
the constitutional text. I then identify three margins along which agenda-setting 
rules in the Constitution vary. First, rules can regulate either the starting point of a 
decision-making process or, alternatively, require a subsequent concurrence by a 
given institution. Second, agenda-setting rules can be intramural—in the sense of 
assigning power over a decision to the same entity with ultimate authority to 
act—or external, in the sense of splitting the power to decide what subject 
government will address from the power to decide that government will, in fact, 
act. Finally, and related to the endogenous/exogenous divide, control of the 
government’s agenda can be assigned to a state actor or to a private, non-state 
actor. 
 
 To taxonomize the constitutional law of agenda setting in this fashion, I 
draw upon two bodies of political science scholarship. The first focuses 
empirically on the ebb and flow of attention to different policy issues, exploring 
the incentives for officials and interest groups to compete strategically for 
influence,12 and the instruments they use to do so.13 The second, labeled the study 
of social choice,14 begins with a pathmarking 1950 article by Kenneth Arrow.15 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 293 (1995). The 
Eskridge-Ferejohn analysis usefully draws attention to how the strategic invocation of sequential 
veto-gates shapes the selection of proposals initially introduced into the lawmaking process, an 
insight I extend here. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 532 (noting that “the threat of a 
veto significantly affects the location of statutory policy”). Finally, there is a small literature on 
the Origination Clause of Article I, Section 7. Rebecca M. Kysar, The "Shell Bill' Game: 
Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (2014) [hereinafter “Kysar, Shell 
Bill”] (offering normative proposals to revive the efficacy of the Origination Clause); Rebecca M. 
Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2013) (criticizing tax 
treaties on Origination Clause grounds); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 424-25 (2004) (analyzing effect of the 
Origination Clause). This article draws on all these previous analyses, but its aim is more synoptic 
than these precursors. Rather than exploring one retail element of the Constitution’s mechanisms 
for framing decision-making, it develops a comprehensive approach to the identification and 
evaluation of the Constitution’s agenda-setting rules. 
12 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2011) (exploring 
how issues become part of the public agenda); BRIAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE 
POLITICS OF ATTENTION (2d ed. 2005) (examining how policymakers obtain and use information 
to legislative agenda). 
13 See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37 
(2003) (developing the concept of “conversational entrepreneurs,” who seed demand among 
political elites for policy change); see also Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing 
Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007) (providing an overview of such framing effects). 
14 My focus here is social choice literature catalyzed by Arrow’s work on the transformation of 
individual preferences into collective choices. For useful summaries of the key technical results in 
this literature, see AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970) [hereinafter 
“SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE”], and Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45 
ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977). This literature is distinct from the public choice scholarship, which 
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Arrow developed a “general possibility theorem” that, in rough paraphrase, 
demonstrates that any process for choosing between three or more individual 
preferences over “alternative social states” will either produce incoherent results 
or, alternatively, violate “reasonable-looking” conditions for democratic choice.16 
In the influential gloss offered by political scientist William Riker, Arrow’s 
theorem shows that “so long as a society preserves democratic institutions, its 
members can expect that some of their social choices will be unordered or 
inconsistent.” 17  Instead, those in power can manipulate the agenda—or the 
inclination of participants to vote strategically—to determine the outputs of a 
collective-choice mechanism.18 Legal scholars have been cognizant of social 
choice theory for decades now, but have focused on its negative implications for 
the coherence of legislative and judicial outputs.19 This Article exploits a different 
insight from social-choice theory: that there are many different ways of managing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
centers on the formation and behavior of various interest groups in the face of collective action 
costs. MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GOODS 2 (1965). Social choice and public choice analyses are sometimes concatenated to generate 
mutually reinforcing justifications for normative reform proposals. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 410 (1989) (invoking social 
choice theory to support “the findings of public choice theory [that] would treat statutes as lacking 
coherent normative underpinnings”) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes”]; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 284 (1988) (invoking Arrow’s theorem to similar ends).  
14 OLSEN, supra note 13, at 2.  
15 Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950); 
see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
16 ERIC MASKIN & AMARTYA SEN, THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 33-36, 38 (2014). 
17 WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 136 (1982) [hereinafter “Riker, Liberalism 
against Populism”]. 
18 Id.; accord DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 39-40 (1958).  
19 Judge Frank Easterbrook, for example, famously complained that it is “difficult, sometimes 
impossible, to aggregate [legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice.” Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547-48 (1983); accord Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 51 (1984) (making the analog point that interest-group bargaining for legislative 
outcomes may suffer from an empty core problem); see also Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and 
Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 
GEO. L. J. 1787, 1822 (1992) (using Arrow’s theorem to argue for more robust judicial review). 
To the extent this literature counsels for more searching judicial review based on inferences about 
legislative incoherence, it suffers from a pervasive nirvana problem because it fails to account for 
instability in multimember courts. For a penetrating critique along these lines, see Maxwell L. 
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1225-26 n.18 & 1229-
30 (1994) [hereinafter “Stearns, Misguided Renaissance”]. Similar criticisms were lodged against 
the decisions of multi-member courts. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence 
and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1977) (“Decision making by multi-judge appellate 
courts ... [and other collective decision makers] display[s] features that may make them vulnerable 
to similar theoretical criticism [based on social choice].”); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) (identifying 
aggregation difficulties as a central problem in the analysis of multimember courts); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (same). 
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instability in collective choice, such that wholesale skepticism is an unnecessary 
response.20  
 
Having demonstrated the utility of an agenda-control lens, I then ask how 
successful the Framer’s initial distribution of agenda-setting authorities has been. 
The original dispensation of agenda control powers, I argue, has not proved 
durable. Rather, agenda-setting powers have diffused across branch boundaries or 
from within government to non-state actors. A central change has been a large 
shift of decisional authority from Congress to both the executive and (less often 
remarked) the judiciary. Building on earlier work about the negotiated character 
of interbranch arrangements,21 I contend that derogations from the constitutional 
law of agenda control are best explained by the fact that political actors and 
branches have traded their original agenda-control authorities. The Constitution, 
in effect, has provided a framework for bargaining, not a Procrustean network of 
constraints. The ensuing negotiated redistribution of agenda control powers is an 
overlooked element of the history of shifting interbranch relations over the past 
century. As such, it illuminates the dynamics of constitutional change around the 
separation of powers.22  
 
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining 
why agenda control is a consequential margin of constitutional design by mining 
on the aforementioned two bodies of political science research. Part II adumbrates 
the heterogeneous solutions to the problem of agenda setting found in the original 
Constitution, focusing on the separation of powers. It develops a taxonomical 
framework for classifying and evaluating agenda control mechanisms. The final 
Part then evaluates how the Framers’ choices fared. It demonstrates that branches 
have traded agenda-control entitlements in ways that have critically shaped the 
                                                            
20 Another line of legal scholarship attacks the assumptions and definitions of Arrow’s theorem, 
and in particular its definition of rationality. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2146-58, 2192 (1990); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: 
Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990) (arguing that formal 
assumptions of Arrow's Theorem's rarely hold). For an comprehensive response to such criticisms, 
see JOHN W. PATTY & ELIZABETH MAGGIE PENN, SOCIAL CHOICE AND LEGITIMACY: THE 
POSSIBILITIES OF IMPOSSIBILITY 32-33 (2015).  
21 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014) 
[hereinafter “Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution”]. 
22 This is true in both the separation-of-powers context, see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise 
of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (1994) (pointing to “the demise of the 
nondelegation doctrine” and the “death of the Unitary Executive” as motors of change in the 
constitutional dispensation); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking As Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 
1003, 1016 (2015) (characterizing extant constraints on legislative delegation as “toothless”), and 
the federalism context, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 304 (2015) (“Today, however, the enumerated-powers principle 
hardly restrains Congress's substantive power.”). 
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historical trajectory of institutional development. It further addresses the 
normative question how the ensuing changes should be evaluated.  
 
I. Agenda Control as an Object of Constitutional Design 
 
 Theorists of constitutional design as early as Rousseau have recognized 
the importance of agenda control.23 Drawing on that literature, this Part unearths 
two general reasons for attending to the question. The first draws on an empirical 
literature about the formation of national policy agendas. The second mines social 
choice scholarship to show why agenda control is inevitably a part of 
constitutional design  
 
A. The Circumstances of Democratic Choice  
 
 Constitutional adjudication is intensely focused on prohibitory effects. 
Constitutional design, though, is not solely a matter of constraining the state. 
Before constraint, constitutions must articulate basic forms of the state as a 
framework for ongoing governance.24 The American iteration is also a “blueprint 
for democratic governance.”25 To further this end, the Constitution must account 
for how democratic contestation unfurls. In three ways, the quotidian 
circumstances of democratic politics create a need for constitutional agenda-
control mechanisms. 
 
First, governments are typically confronted with “a great number of real, 
tangible issues” at any one moment, but “can attend to them only one at a time.”26 
The first step of democratic choice, therefore, is sorting a subclass of issues to 
                                                            
23 See John T. Scott, Rousseau’s Anti-Agenda-Setting Agenda and Contemporary Democratic 
Theory, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 137, 140-41 (2005) (discussing how Rousseau in The Social 
Contract envisaged the allocation of power to initiate policy-making to the legislative branch). 
Scott’s analysis is a persuasive response to an earlier suggestion that Rousseau allocated agenda-
setting authority to experts in the government. Ethan Putterman, Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and 
Majority-Rule, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 461 (2003) (reading Rousseau as envisaging “expert 
agenda setters [who] would advance and enhance citizen participation”). 
24 The enabling function of constitutional design is stressed by STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND 
CONSTRAINTS: THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing constitutional rules 
to grammatical rules, which “do not merely retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do 
many thanks they would not otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”). 
25 Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some 
Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003) (emphasis 
added). Not all constitutions, of course, strive aim toward democratic government. Tom Ginsburg 
& Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE 
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-5 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 
2008) (explaining the function of constitutions in authoritarian regimes). 
26 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 10. 
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consider seriously.27  This entails creation of a “list of subjects or problems to 
which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given 
time.”28 Such lists are not defined by exogenous shocks alone. Even casual 
acquaintance with the rhythms of national politics should reveal that the mere fact 
that an issue makes headlines—be it drought in the western states, a looming 
federal deficit, crime, or immigration surges—does not all suffice to elicit new 
legislation or regulation. It requires conscious mobilization, typically by political 
elites, to mold crisis into an occasion for state action.29  
 
Second, once an issue advances onto the government’s radar, there are 
almost always non-binary choices between paths of state action. For example, 
there are often civil and criminal regulatory options. Proposals to criminalize 
implicate decisions about how to calibrate a continuous variable of sentence 
severity. Noncriminal regulation require choices over forms of regulation (e.g., 
command-and-control vs. market mechanisms), the mix of public and private 
enforcement, and the range of legal and equitable remedies. In many domains, 
officials face plural, incompatible regulatory approaches. In the healthcare 
context, for example, Congress recently had to elect between (among other 
options) a Canadian-style single payer system, expansion of employer-based 
coverage, or an individual-mandate approach to market correction.30 This need for 
agenda-setting between policy options persists through the decision-making 
process.  
 
Third, the government’s agenda is typically an object of interest-group 
contestation that requires channeling and resolution. Interest groups mobilize to 
elevate novel issues onto the government’s agenda and then to frame issues so as 
to maximize their comparative advantage,31 and to engage in “negative blocking” 
of disfavored issues.32 Interest groups also shape the range of policy options 
considered by officials. As the national economy has expanded in complexity, 
                                                            
27 See David A. Rochefort & Robert W. Cobb, Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy 
Choice, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 56, 56 (1993). 
28 KINGDON, supra note 12, at 3. 
29 See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 13, at 3. For a brilliant demonstration of this point in the crime 
policy context, see Vesla Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Criminal 
Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 234-36 (2007).  
30 Congress was familiar with this range of options. Matthew P. Harrington, Health Care Crimes: 
Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 111-12 (1994) (describing considerations of 
these options during President Clinton’s effort to obtain a new healthcare law during the 103rd 
Congress). 
31 Olsen’s canonical work on public choice suggests that the efficacy of an interest group is 
inversely correlated to its transaction cost of mobilization. OLSEN, supra note 13, at 2. 
32 KINGDON, supra note 12, at 46, 48-49 (finding that “interest groups loom very large indeed” in 
agenda-setting efforts). 
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interest groups have grown in “number and diversity.”33 They increasingly supply 
a “legislative subsidy” 34 in the form of policy information, political intelligence, 
and legislative labor to strategically selected legislators. This epistemic role 
situates interest groups to shape both how issues are defined35 and remedied.36 An 
important role of the constitution is channeling and harnessing such activity into 
productive legislative form.  
 
B. Agenda Control as an Equilibrating Mechanism in Collective-Choice 
Mechanisms  
 
Social choice theory illuminates a second important justification for 
agenda-setting mechanisms in constitutional design. This literature identifies 
irreconcilable tensions between demands for coherence and for minimal 
democratic credentials in collective-choice mechanisms. It teaches that instability 
(or cycling) is imminently possible in all normatively plausible mechanisms for 
aggregating inputs from more than two decision-makers over more than two 
options, and that an inexorable specter of instability haunts democratic 
constitutional design. A constitution’s framers face difficult trade-offs between 
the risks of instability in collective outcomes, of strategic voting, and of the abuse 
of agenda-control power.  
 
To unpack these basic points, this section briefly sets forth some core 
results of social choice theory. First, key technical results—most importantly, 
Arrow’s original theorem—are summarized in nontechnical terms. Second, I 
elaborate institutional implications of those results, focusing on the role of agenda 
control and strategic voting in suppressing instability. Finally, the extent of 
federal government action implicating the potential for cycling is mapped.   
 
                                                            
33 BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 177.  
34 Richard Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 
69-70 (2008). Access to legislators to provide information, however, appears to be a function of 
campaign contributions. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions 
Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, -- AM. J. POL. SCI. 
– (forthcoming 2015) (reporting results of a randomized experiment to the effect that campaign 
contributions to congressional staff offered access four times more often when contributions were 
made than when no contributions were made).  
35 See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 309 (1997) 
(“Political debates on policy issues are often portrayed as a conflict over competing definitions of 
a social condition.”). Questions of causation provide an especially fruitful object of interest-group 
contestation. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. 
SCI. Q. 281, 283 (1989). 
36 Cf. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 29 (“[M]uch of the policy process is determined 
by the artful connection of solutions to problems.”). 
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1. Instability and Incoherence in Collective Choice  
 
 Consider three individuals (1, 2, and 3) with three options (A, B, and C) 
and the following distribution of preferences (where “›” stands for “is preferred 
to”): 
 
Table 1: The Condorcet Cycle  
 
Person Order of Preferences 
1 A › B › C 
2 B › C › A 
3 C › A › B 
 
The three individuals use majority-rule to decide between pairs of options in turn. 
In seriatim votes, A beats B, B beats C, and then C beats A. Application of a 
majority rule to these options, therefore, generates a series of intransitive 
outcomes, or what is termed a Condorcet cycle. 37  In this and many other 
collective choice situations, there is also no Condorcet winner: an option that 
beats all others in pairwise voting. 38  An examination of Table 1 demonstrates 
that any outcome, A, B, or C, can be destabilized by a new majority-rule vote, and 
that there will always be someone who stands to gain from seeking that vote. For 
example, once C is selected, 1 will request a vote on C versus B. For this reasons, 
the results in Table 1 exemplify instability or cycling. Further, the results can also 
be labeled incoherent insofar as there seems to be no singular way of translating 
underlying individual preferences into a single ‘right’ outcome that represents a 
single collective choice.39 
    
Arrow’s theorem implies that “many minimally democratic systems will 
in some situation produce an intransitive ordering … similar to [a Condorcet 
cycle].”40 As updated in 1963,41 Arrow’s theorem identifies four criteria that a 
reasonable mechanism for aggregating individual preferences into a collective 
choice should meet. According to Arrow, a reasonable aggregation rule should 
meet the following criteria: (1) It should be Pareto efficient, insofar as if every 
                                                            
37 PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 13. 
38 Id.  
39 Riker identifies a “populist interpretation of voting” to the effect that “the opinion of the people 
must be right and must be respected because the will of the people is the liberty of the people.” 
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 14. But, it is hardly clear any theorist 
endorses such a view. Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 27-
28 (1986) (discussing Rousseau’s and Bentham’s views).  
40 PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 14. 
41 The following account draws on the elegant account in Sen and Maskin, supra note 16, at 33-38, 
and the more extended and technical treatment in PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 20-69 
(explaining theorem and offered extended defenses of each condition). The version of the theorem 
set forth here was first developed in ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 15, at 22-33. 
 12 
individual prefers A to B, A should prevail. (2) It should satisfy the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives condition: when ranking two alternatives, A and B, 
preferences over C should not influence the result of the aggregation 
mechanism.42 (3) It should be transitive, i.e., it should produce an unambiguous 
winner or collection of winners.43 (4) It should be non-dictatorial, in that it 
responds to the preferences of more than one person. The nub of Arrow’s result is 
that there is no aggregation rule—not majority rule, supermajority rules, plurality 
vote rules, Borda count, and not the market44—that consistently satisfies all these 
conditions. To generate coherent outputs across all cases, the Arrow theorem 
holds, the mechanism must give way along one of these four margins.     
 
Subsequent theoretical work extends and refines this basic result. For 
example, later studies examined the possibility of cycling under majority rule.45 
Building on Arrow’s initial result, Plott and others demonstrated that a majority 
vote rule will generate transitive outputs in only a limited set of cases.46 Another 
vein of theoretical work, developed by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, examined the 
tendency of preference aggregation mechanisms to elicit strategic or insincere 
behavior. They demonstrated that every nontrivial preference mechanism (except 
for a dictator) can elicit strategic voting from participants.47  Finally, McKelvey 
demonstrated that when a preference aggregation mechanism engenders potential 
voting cycles, there is always an agenda that, once chosen, will lead to the choice 
of any possible policy alternative within the space of options under 
                                                            
42 Lest this sound arcane, consider the use of plurality vote rule in presidential elections, where the 
choice between two main party candidates A and B can be altered by the presence of a ‘spoiler’ 
third candidate C . “The independence axiom serves to rule out spoilers.” SEN AND MASKIN, supra 
note 16, at 48.  
43 In Sen and Maskin, the third criterion is “unrestricted domain,” which requires that “[f]or any 
logically possible set of preferences, there is a social ordering R.” Id. at 34. This emphasizes the 
fact that the aggregation rule cannot ex ante rule out by fiat a subset of alternative options as a way 
of generating intransitivity.  
44 See Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 781 n.17 (2005).  
45 There are plenty of reasons for endorsing majority rule as a desirable aggregation rule. Kenneth 
O. May, A Set of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 
ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).  
46 A majority vote rule generates stable outputs when there is only one issue to decide, where 
preferences or interests are similar or nearly unanimous, and where preferences are delicately 
balanced against each other. William H. Riker & Barry Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of 
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 373, 382 (1988); see also Charles Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under 
Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967). 
47 Allen Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587, 
587 (1973) (asserting that any nondictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes 
is subject to individual manipulation); Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's 
Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare 
Functions, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 187, 193, 192-202 (1975). 
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consideration.48 In later work, McKelvey identified distributions of preferences 
and voting rules for which the possibility of cycling (and, hence, of manipulation 
by agenda control) is relatively low.49 These results illustrate that allocations of 
agenda-control power dramatically change the stability, coherence, and 
substances of outputs from collective choice mechanisms. 
 
Neither Arrow’s theorem nor its extensions are empirical in nature. They 
do not predict the frequency of instability under any given decision rule.50 There 
is vigorous, ongoing debate about how often either Cordorcetian cycling or other 
forms of instability are observed in the real-world political institutions.51 There is 
also disagreement as to whether the formal possibility of strategic voting under a 
given aggregation mechanism will necessarily imply the observed fact of strategic 
voting. 52  Nevertheless, an observed absence of instability (in the form of 
Condorcet cycles) or strategic action (whether by an agenda setter or voters) does 
not mean an aggregation rule is invulnerable to incoherence or instability 
critiques. In part, this is because instability might not arise due to the exercise of a 
strategic agenda control (as McKelvey shows) strategic voting (as Gibbard and 
Satterthwaite predict).  
 
From the perspective of the constitutional framer, social-choice theoretical 
results have bite regardless of instability’s empirical frequency. Typically, those 
who design a constitution strive to create an enduring document, not one good for 
                                                            
48 Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multi-Dimensional Voting Models and Some 
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976) (demonstrating that “where all 
voters evaluate policy in terms of Euclidean metric, if there is no equilibrium outcome ... it is 
theoretically possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any given point, will end 
up at any other point in the space of alternatives”); RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra 
note 17, at 187 (providing a summary of McKelvey’s result). 
49 Richard D. McKelvey, Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice, 
18 Am. J. POL. SCI. 283, 283 (1986); see also Norman Schofield et al., The Core and the Stability 
of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 195, 207-08 (1988). 
50 Riker & Weingast, supra note 48, at 382 (“Arrow's Theorem is a possibility theorem. It says 
only that an event can occur, not that it will occur or has often occurred.”) 
51 Compare id. at 388-93 (providing examples from congressional debates); with GERRY MACKIE, 
DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003) (rejecting examples). 
52 SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 14, at 195 (arguing that in many democratic choice 
situations, people are “guided not so much by maximization of expected utility, but something 
much simpler, viz, just a desire to record one’s true preference”). Elsewhere, Sen develops the 
concept of a commitment, defined “in terms of a person choosing an act that he believes will yield 
a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is available to him,” as an 
explanation for the refusal to engage in strategic voting. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A 
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 327 
(1977). For another skeptical view of the relevance of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite and McKelvey 
results, see Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: 
Perspectives of A "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1554 (1993).  
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a single ride.53 This requires a collective choice mechanism that works with many 
different permutations of popular preferences. The constitutional designer thus 
cannot assume that the distribution of preferences will be such that instability and 
incoherence will not be concerns. 
 
2. Institutional Responses to Instability in Collective Choice: Agenda 
Control and Strategic Voting   
 
A central implication of Arrow’s theorem for constitutional design is that 
that task must begin by “identifying which assumption(s) is relaxed for each 
institution” and then to proceed by “comparing the ability of a given institution to 
which collective decision-making responsibility has been assigned under the 
Constitution to issue a rational collective design.”54 That any method of collective 
choice will fall short of meeting all four of Arrow’s conditions means that 
comparative judgments are in practice inevitable.  
 
There are, roughly speaking, three general categories of responses to 
instability in collective-choice mechanisms. I set these out, but must stress at the 
outset that this Article is focused on the third response. First, a designer might 
tolerate a certain degree of instability within a preference aggregation system. 
This might be justified on pluralist grounds as “provid[ing] a way to avoid 
rejecting some fundamental values in situations when not all can be satisfied at 
once.”55 Second, certain collective choice mechanisms do not allow cycling 
because they stipulate a fixed number of ‘rounds’ of voting. Such mechanisms do, 
however, invite strategic voting. The plurality voting rule used in presidential 
elections, for example, will often mean that “supporters of third parties vote for 
their second choice in order to defeat the major party candidate they like the 
least.”56 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite result suggests that the institutional design 
question is less whether to allow strategic voting—its possibility is endemic—but, 
rather, whether to adopt measures to dampen, if not eliminate, it. 
 
The third possibility—which most concerns me here—is that a designer 
will arrange a collective choice mechanism to allocate agenda control among 
institutional players in some stable and regular way. Institutional designers, as 
Shepsle and Weingast observe, can strive for “structure-induced equilibrium” by 
                                                            
53 But perhaps this is a mistake: The average duration of a constitution, however, is only seventeen 
years. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 120 (2009). The U.S. Constitution is an outlier. Id. at 101. 
54 Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 19, at 1232; see also Saul Levmore, From Cynicism 
to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (2002) (noting that the 
takeaway of aggregation paradoxes for legal theorists need not be skepticism, but rather conduce 
to “the study of how we do the best we can in the face of difficulties”).  
55 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2171-72. 
56 RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 145-51. 
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carefully channeling “the sometimes subtle influence provided by control over 
structure and procedure.”57 Conscious allocation of agenda control power to one 
or another institution justified because it should elicit regularity and stability in 
state action.58 
 
What does it mean to assign agenda control to a given actor? The social-
choice literature suggests this term has a capacious meaning. At a minimum, it 
captures a class of cases in which collective choice is required to begin or end 
with certain steps, and where the structure of a multi-stage aggregation rule 
determines outcomes.59  But it sweeps more broadly than this. Riker commented 
on the “significance, variety and pervasiveness” of agenda-setting devices.60 They 
include powers to initiate policy-making, to veto proposals, to identify 
policymakers, to resolve ambiguities in extant policies, and to determine who may 
offer proposals. Consistent with this view, I develop in Part II.A a capacious 
account of agenda-control devices within the Constitution.  
 
In sum, I draw a rather different lesson for institutional design from the 
social choice literature choice from earlier scholars. The finding of Arrovian 
instability has transfixed legal scholars, motivating coruscating critiques of both 
legislative and multimember courts’ decisions. Skepticism, though, is not a 
necessary inference from social choice theory.61 Although its core results cast 
                                                            
57 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, 1 
J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 136-37 (1989) (“[A] structure induced equilibrium may be defined as 
an alternative … that is invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of 
procedure, is preferred by all individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive 
veto or voting power”); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-induced Equilibrium 
and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503. 507-14 (1981) (analyzing a series of equilibrium-
inducing institutional design options). 
58 Accord William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study 
of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 443 ((1980); see also Terry M. Moe, Political 
Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 216 (1990) (“Politics is 
stable because of the distinctive role that institutions play,” in particular in determining ex ante 
“what alternatives get considered, in what order, and by whom.”).  
59 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 43-46 (2000) (describing the process in 
which agenda setting chooses outcomes); accord Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of 
Arrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) (suggesting that 
intransitivity leads to dictatorial power being exercised in a social choice function by agenda 
setters). 
60 RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note --, at 169. 
61 In a much cited piece, Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson treat Arrow’s theorem as a threat 
to the normative force of democracy, but respond that “because the values people care about in 
individual choice and democratic politics are plural and often incommensurable, those values 
cannot be expressed adequately through consistent preference rankings over outcomes described 
in the sparse terms available to social choice theory.” Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2142; 
id. at 2160-61 (giving an example of inconsistent individual preferences); see also id. at 2186 
(identifying as their target “the claim that social choice theory ‘proves’ that democratic systems 
cannot be rationally responsive to citizens' desires, values, and interests”). Aggregation, on this 
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doubt on the possibility of identifying in all cases a single outcome as the unique 
product of collective choice, Arrow’s theorem hardly implies that democratic 
institutional design is a fool’s errand. There is no need to assume that a unique 
collective choice, as opposed to a “set of acceptable outcomes,” exists, and 
Arrow’s theorem suggests that an aggregation mechanism that can provide at least 
some evidence of individuals’ summed judgments is of passable utility.62 With 
this weaker ambition in hand, one of many aggregation rules that operate as 
“pretty good truth tracker[s]” may suffice.63  
 
* * * 
  
This Part has identified two reasons why a constitution must address 
agenda control. First, the circumstances of democratic politics in an extended, 
heterogeneous republic present state actors with many more potential objects of 
regulation than can feasibly be tacked at a single time. Exogenous shocks alone 
do not establish priorities, and capacity constraints mean there is a need to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
account, is an incomplete method for realizing democratic choice. Id. This is a “narrow” view of 
social choice theory’s implications. PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 32-33 (faulting Pildes and 
Anderson for insisting on the need for social norms and institutional rules, while simultaneously 
“miss[ing] the crucial point: [Arrow’s and subsequent] results … indicate why … norms, rules, 
and practices are required to produce meaningful and coherent democratic outcomes”). Of note 
here, Pildes and Anderson do not categorically deny the need for some form of aggregation 
mechanism in a democratic polity. To the contrary, the recognize that social choice theory can 
help isolate some of the trade-offs implicit in democratic institutional design. Pildes & Anderson, 
supra note 20, at 2196-97 (recognizing that sometimes “agenda-setting elites” exist, and the 
relevant normative question “whether the [agenda control] power is managed, distributed, or 
contained in ways that over time further democratic values”). They do not, however, pursue in 
detail the range of institutional responses resolving trade-offs generated in the design of collective 
choice mechanisms. 
62 Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6, 15-17 (1986) 
(developing, in response to Riker, a series of defenses of the meaningfulness of collective choice 
given Arrow’s theorem); see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2187 (rejecting 
consistency as a criteria of rationality). 
63 Gerry Mackie, The reception of social choice theory by democratic theory, in MAJORITY 
DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 77, 89 (Stéphanie Novak & Jon Elster eds. 2014). A more 
recent effort to define a nonempty class of legitimate choice procedures, developed by John Patty 
and Elizabeth Penn, focuses on internal consistency and stability of that mechanism. On their 
view, internal stability requires (1) sensibility of outcome—i.e. “no alternative in the sequence of 
considered alternatives is strictly superior to the final choice”; and (2) sequence coherence—that 
the “order of decision-making not contradict the presumption that reasoning was guided by the 
underlying principle”; and (3) stability, which “implies that inclusion of any alternative in the 
decision sequence would either introduce a policy that is incomparable to the final policy choice 
or violate internal consistency.” PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 91-103. They demonstrate that 
“the set of legitimate choices is always well defined and non empty.” Id. at 119. Although I do not 
apply their notion of legitimate choice here—which does not plainly fit any constitutional 
mechanism—Patty and Penn’s work demonstrates how social choice theory can accommodate 
normative theories that distinguish desirable from undesirable decision rules. 
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integrate some kind of agenda-setting mechanism into the fabric of national 
policy-making institutions.  
 
Second, even once an issue has been identified as appropriate for 
regulation, any collective state actor confronts a cluster of difficulties in reaching 
decisions. The social choice literature points toward a need for constitutional 
structures that induce equilibrium. It demonstrates that the design of collective 
choice mechanisms necessitates a trade-off between different goals, in particular 
the nondictatorship and unrestricted domain conditions. Agenda control 
mechanisms, moreover, come in different flavors. Different circumstances may 
warrant different solutions. A fair implication of the social choice literature, 
therefore, is that a constitutional designer must exercise a measure of judgment 
over which agenda control mechanisms to uses.  
 
 II. Agenda Control Mechanisms in Constitutional Law  
 
This Part develops an account of agenda control mechanisms originally to 
be found in the Constitution. I begin by offering a working definition of ‘agenda 
control’ tailored to constitutional analysis. I then identify agenda-setting rules in 
the original constitutional text. My focus here is on interbranch relations, where 
problems of agenda control loom large and where the Framers’ design choices can 
be picked out with greatest perspicuity. That is not to say that agenda control does 
not emerge as a design choice elsewhere in constitutional law; it is simply that the 
separation of powers context is one in which problem of agenda control loom 
prominently.64   
                                                            
64 Consider, for example, federalism. On the one hand, collective state action via treaty is 
prohibited. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1. This means that states do not need a mechanism to 
resolve agenda control problems in the mine run of things. Nevertheless, states have developed a 
suite of subconstitutional organizations, such as associations, to engage in collective action. See 
Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 217, 288-92 (2014) (documenting informal solutions to facilitate states’ collective action). 
Article V, moreover, anticipates two forms of supermajoritarian state action to propose and ratify 
amendments. It is possible to imagine cycles emerging in the ratification process is states were 
able to first ratify and then rescind their acquiescence to an amendment. States’ power to rescind is 
unclear. On the one hand, judicial precedent sparked by Kansas’s attempted rescission of the child 
labor amendment suggests withdrawal is impermissible. See Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390, 
400-03, 71 P.2d 518, 524-26 (1937), aff'd on other grounds, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). On the other 
hand, the 1924 Wadsworth-Garrett proposal to amend Article V would have provided that “until 
three-fourths of the States have ratified or more than one-fourth of the States have rejected or 
defeated a proposed amendment, any State may change its vote.” 65 Cong. Rec. 4492-93 (1924); 
66 Cong. Rec. 2159 (1925). A rule against rescission of a ratification might be justified as a 
solution to Arrovian instability, at the cost of making amendments harder to enact. Given the 
difficulty of changing the constitutional text at present, the latter’s marginal cost may though be 
minimal. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (2014). A 




A. A Definition of Agenda Control  
 
The term ‘agenda control’ is widely used in both the policy-making 
literature and the social choice literature. Nevertheless, it does not have a clear 
definition upon which all converge. Instead, a working definition for 
constitutional analysis must be stitched together from hints, allusions, and theories 
across both the political science and the legal scholarship.  
 
To begin, scholars working in the empirical political science literature on 
continuity and change in national policy-making treat policy agendas as the 
product of plural social forces, including interest groups, media, as well as official 
actors.65 This literature is not focused on questions of institutional design or legal 
rules, and hence has no need for precise identification of the institutional forms of 
agenda control. In contrast, the social choice literature is centrally concerned with 
the design of aggregation mechanisms such as elections, legislative processes, or 
adjudication. Nevertheless, a clear definition of agenda control does not emerge 
from the social choice literature either. Although Riker points to examples such as 
legislative leadership’s ability to “select alternatives among with decisions will be 
made, and … procedures for coming to a choice,”66 he does not provide a 
comprehensive definition.  
 
More usefully, Patty and Penn define “the agenda” as the act of 
“constructing the decision sequence [of options and expressions of preferences 
through voting or otherwise].”67 They further observe that “a common thread 
among political institution” is that powers of “proposing, shepherding, and 
defending potential policy choices [are] generally explicitly assigned to one or 
more individuals.”68 Their analysis suggests that the notion of agenda control 
encompasses control not just of a starting point for deliberation, but also the 
length, structure and composition of its sequence.69 Consistent with this approach, 
Levine and Plott posit that an agenda has two functions: “it limits the information 
                                                            
65 See KINGDON, supra note 12, at 20 (including interest groups, legislative coalitions, the 
administration, and the “national mood” as causal forces in agenda creation); BAUMGARTNER & 
JONES, supra note 12, at 59-82, 175-92 (documenting the roles of a similarly variegated set of 
actors and social forces).  
66 RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 169; id. at 173-4 (supplying the 
example of Pliny the Younger’s control of the structure of voting in the Roman Senate). 
67 PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 93; see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2195 n.187 
(refraining from giving a definition of agenda control, but intimating that it includes” establishing 
sequences of decisions”). For other discussions of agenda control that focus on sequence alone, 
see Levine & Plott, supra note 19, at 564;  
68 PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 125.  
69 This is consistent with Banks’s definition of an agenda as “a means of facilitating the decision 
problem of voters when faced with a set of alternatives … an ordering of alternatives from which 
pairwise comparisons may be made.” J.S. Banks, Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda 
Control, 1 SOC. CHOICE 295, 295 (1985).  
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available to individual decision-makers” and “determines the set of strategies 
available.” 70  Similarly, Stearns observes that agenda-setting powers include 
timing-related powers to set “[d]eadlines and limitations on reconsideration.”71  
 
Consistent with these approaches, the following definition of agenda 
control power provides a starting point for the analysis of constitutional rules. A 
constitutional agenda-setting rule is one (1) found in constitutional text or 
jurisprudence that (2) vests an office, person, or organization, explicitly or 
implicitly, with authority to define the persons involved in, or the substantive 
scope, timing, voting rule, or sequencing of a decision-making process that can 
generate a legal rule or other outcome with the force and effect of law. More 
informally, agenda-setting rules concern the who and the how of state power, not 
questions of what may be done.  
 
Because it does not include boundary-setting rules on the reach of state 
power, this definition of agenda-setting rules marks out a species of constitutional 
question distinct and separate from the modal puzzles of constitutional law.72 It 
also distinguishes the constitutional law of agenda-setting from a related, but non-
constitutional, body of congressional procedures for organizing the internal 
legislative process. Legislative procedures, which are endogenously produced by 
each chamber, 73  assign agenda-setting authority among various members of 
Congress to important effect.  Although the Constitution licenses such rules—
                                                            
70 Levine & Plott, supra note 19, at 564-65. 
71 Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 19, at 1273; see also Mattias K. Polborn & Gerald 
Willman, Optimal Agenda-setter timing, 42 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1527, 1536 (2009) (modeling 
agenda-setting in a committee context, and demonstrating that part of the value of agenda-setting 
is the power to alter the timing a decision in ways that increase or decrease the option value of 
learning more about a policy on the part of other participants).  
72 I also exclude a wide range of other kinds of rules found in the Constitution. These include, for 
example the selection of officials, see, e.g., U.S. CONST., Art I, §§2 & 5 (selection rules for 
representatives and senators), the punishment of officials, Art I, § 2, cl. 4 & § 3, cl. 6 
(impeachment), or textual amendment of the Constitution, Art. V, among other matters. Agenda 
control questions do, nevertheless, arise in respect to these provisions. Consider, for example the 
sequence of action envisaged by the impeachment clauses, with the House first voting articles of 
impeachment, and then the Senate trying those articles alone. In the mine run of things, this likely 
means the Senate’s preferences operate as a constraint on the House, for a House focused on 
impeachment will necessarily anticipate the likely preferences of the Senate in crafting 
impeachment articles. On the other hand, however, the House’s power to determine the scope of 
articles allows it to craft grounds for impeachment that either place the Senate under great political 
pressure to convict, or that render it difficult to convict but politically costly to acquit. The House, 
in this way, has the power to create tensions between legal and political imperatives for the Senate. 
The agenda-setting regime over impeachment, in order words, has complex distributive effects as 
between the two chambers of Congress.  
73 The Constitution requires as much. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl 2 (“Each House may determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings ….”). 
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allocating their authorship to distinct chambers—I keep the specific content of 
those rules largely outside this analysis so as to keep my project tractable.74 
 
B. The Agenda Control Powers of Congress 
 
This section identifies a series of mechanisms in Article I and beyond that 
stabilize legislative outcomes, and in doing so, parcel out authority to select some 
issues rather than others for governmental attention. Solving Congress’s social-
choice problem, that is, simultaneously determines which governmental actors 
have power to set the public policy agenda.   
The Constitution disperses lawmaking power between two houses of 
Congress and the president by assigning different agenda control powers to 
different institutional actors. One example of an agenda-setting power, found in 
the Origination Clause of Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, is the House’s authority 
to initiate the legislative process on fiscal matters.75 Another is embodied in the 
subsequent clause, which describes a sequence of lawmaking involving two-house 
passage, presidential consideration and potential White House veto, and finally, a 
super-majoritarian override procedure.76 While neither the second house nor the 
president directly determine the metes and bounds of a legislative proposal, their 
exercise of a “veto power”77 necessarily shapes the contents of threshold bill 
proposals: the proposing chamber seeking to enact a bill into law will rationally 
anticipate and shape a measure in conformity to the expected preferences of 
subsequent veto players. 78  Divergences in the preferences of the pivotal 
institutional actors impede enactment of any new law,79 narrowing the space of 
enactable legislative proposals.    
This basic structure of legislative choice in the federal government 
embodies a complex, Burkian solution to social choice problems. Three design 
choices are worth isolating and analyzing as forms of agenda-setting embedded 
                                                            
74 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 362 (“Methodologically, it is impossible to talk fruitfully about 
the design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once ….”). For an analysis of 
congressional procedures though a social choice theory lens, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary 
Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989) [hereinafter 
“Levmore, Parliamentary Law”]. 
75 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.:) 
76 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. 
77 CHARLES CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE POWER 
46 (2000).  
78 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 529-33 (modeling bicameralism and presentment as a 
sequential game with perfect information). For a similar model under a different label of “pivotal 
politics,” see KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF LAWMAKING 21-28 (1998).  
79 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 532 (“The Framers expected the House, Senate, and 
President to have widely dispersed preferences about the status quo, and therefore the no-statute 
game (Case 2) was most likely in the short term.”). 
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within constitutional text and jurisprudence. Attention to the agenda-setting 
function of these elements of the Constitution, I endeavor to show, surfaces 
consequences and internal conflicts that would otherwise go unobserved.  
1.   Bicameralism and Presentment 
 
It is useful to begin with the most facially prominent agenda-setting 
element of Article I: the requirement that the House, the Senate, and the President 
(almost always) all concur in a bill before it becomes law. By requiring 
concurrence from several veto players across both Houses and the presidency, 
bicameralism and presentment dramatically narrows the domain of plausible 
legislative proposals.80 That space, in expectation, will be smaller than the space 
of enactable policy preferences turning on either a pair’s or a single actor’s 
preferences.   
 
This choice-constraining effect of the concurrence demands of 
bicameralism and presentment is a first agenda-shaping solution to Arrovian 
instability. In an influential treatment of structure-induced equilibrium, Shepsle 
and Weingast observed that “institutional restrictions on the domain of exchange 
[can] induce stability,” albeit at the cost of violating Arrow’s unrestricted domain 
condition.81 The resulting set of options is also likely to be “value-restricted” (i.e. 
there is some option never ranked as either best, worst, or medium by any veto 
player) and thus coherent.82 The structure of veto-gates in the legislative process, 
in short, mitigates the risk of uncertainty by easing one of the four Arrovian 
criteria (unrestricted domain). It does so, moreover, without making the House, 
the Senate, or the President a ‘dictator’ in the sense of having unfettered, or 
largely unfettered, control over the shape of legislative outputs. To the contrary, 
bicameralism may diffuse agenda-setting power since “one chamber’s agenda 
setter will be at the mercy of the order of consideration in the other chamber.”83 
The bicameralism element of Article I, in short, combines with presentment to 
solve a social choice problem, but at the same time to advance another central 
                                                            
80 This is prior, indeed, to the introduction of congressional committees and judicial review into 
the model—new features that reduce the domain of plausible enactments even further. Eskridge & 
Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 539, 548-551. For the sake of expositional clarity, moreover, I omit the 
further complication that discussion of the House or Senate as a unitary actor is misleading: Given 
the procedural rules of each chamber, and the power exercised by party leaders, the preferences of 
the median legislator will not necessarily be pivotal to that body’s endorsement. 
81 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 57, at 507 (emphasis omitted).  
82 SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 14, at 166-86.  
83 Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 145, 147 (1992) [hereinafter “Levmore, Bicameralism”].  
 22 
goal of the Constitution’s separation of powers—the diffusion of political power 
between different elected bodies.84  
Design solutions often have costs. The concurrence demands of 
bicameralism and presentment are no exception. It is by now familiar observation 
that plural veto-gates “often” yield gridlock.85 Gridlock, in turn, constitutes a 
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo.86 This is normatively 
attractive if new lawmaking is presumptively suspicious, and the status quo ante 
to law-making always desirable. For example, if the background to federal 
legislation were a just prepolitical distribution of property rights at risk of 
inequitable corruption by meddling legislative majorities,87 a structure-induced 
equilibrium that favored the status quo might be normative desirable. Such a 
presumption about the baseline distribution of property entitlements, however 
imaginable at the time of the Founding, is plainly implausible now.88 The status 
quo that contemporary legislative coalitions stand to displace is not well described 
as a tabla rasa. It is rather a complex accumulation of previous legislation, 
agency interpretations, presidential unilateralism, and unexpected interactions 
between the multiplicity of regulatory regimes found in the U.S. Code and state 
statute books.89 Thus, the status quo that bicameralism and presentment shields 
might embody background distributions of individual entitlements, the outcomes 
                                                            
84 For a typical statement to this effect, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle 
of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 252 (positing that “the central end of a system 
of separation of powers [is] the diffusion of power to ‘protect the liberty and security of the 
governed.”’ (citation omitted)). 
85 KREHBIEL, supra note 78, at 38-39 (developing the prediction that gridlock “occurs, and occurs 
often” under a pivotal politics model) 
86 Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2077 (2013) 
(“Gridlock is simply the perpetuation of the status quo; it is inertial.”). 
87 For a defense of Article 1, § 7 that seems to rest on these grounds, see David G. Savage, Justice 
Scalia: Americans “Should Learn to Love Gridlock,” L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011) (“Americans 
should learn to love gridlock . . . . The framers (of the Constitution) would say, yes, ‘That's exactly 
the way we set it up. We wanted power contradicting power (to prevent) an excess of legislation.”’ 
(quoting Justice Scalia)); see also William Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: 
Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 
1986 DUKE L. J. 948, 958 (“Article I does not regard a private ordering of society as inviolate. It 
does, however, require that defects in this ordering, and a remedy for them, be carefully identified 
before government upsets it.”). 
88 The Founding-era push for constraints on governmental power, particularly in relation to 
taxation and spending, however, was rooted in a desire to protect slavery. ROBIN L. EINHORN, 
AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 117-58 (2008). That resistance may be defensible on 
independent grounds, but it is hardly clear that we can rely on the Framers’ preferences on the size 
of government as obviously normatively salient.  
89 The effect is complicated by Congress’s use of sunset provisions, which can lead to changes in 
the status quo absent congressional action. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism 
Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1832-34 (2013) (canvassing use of sunset 
provisions). In one case, the Constitution itself imposes a sunset rule in respect to military 
expenditures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (two-year limit on military appropriations). 
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of long and unintended policy drift, or even executive branch adventurism.90 A 
bias in favor of such a baseline has only a thin intrinsic normative justification.91  
This agenda-setting structure has motivated legal disputes when Congress 
has tried to require the concurrence of additional actors. The Court, however, has 
resisted some deviations from the “finely wrought” pathway of Article I, Section 
7.92 In the mid-1980s and 1990s, the Court invalidated three different legislative 
efforts to supplement Article I, Section 7 with, a legislative veto exercised by a 
subset of Congress93; a budgetary mechanism designed to mechanically trim 
deficit spending via automatic fiscal ‘haircuts,’94 and a presidential line-item veto 
again designed to keep budgets in check.95 In each of these cases, the Court read 
the text of the Constitution to establish “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.” 96  The Court’s text-based argument in favor of the 
exclusivity in these cases, however, is unpersuasive. To begin with, notice that in 
many other instances the Court has declined to read the Constitution’s text as 
exhaustive in a similar fashion. The application of the First Amendment to 
executive as well as legislative action, the efflorescence of state sovereign 
immunity doctrines—these are merely the immediately obvious examples. 
Further, the “perception of [textual] clarity or ambiguity is itself often affected by 
interpretive considerations that are commonly thought to be extra-textual [and] is 
partly constructed in American interpretive practice.”97 To conclude that a legal 
text should be read as exclusive or exemplary, one needs some other evidence, 
whether gleaned from structure, history, or a prior understandings of the text’s 
purpose. The Court’s precedent treating Article I, Section 7 as exclusive begs the 
question whether the normative justifications for bicameralism and presentment 
justify that result—a question I return to in Part III.  
                                                            
90 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2013) (describing the baseline preserved by gridlock as 
“arbitrary”). 
91 There is also a rather pessimistic theoretical literature that suggests bicameralism will generate 
results not originally manifested in either chamber, that are not Condorcet choices, and that may 
not be Pareto optimal, see Donald R. Gross, Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting, 35 WEST. 
POL. Q. 511, 512 (1982), as well as producing complex patterns of strategic voting, see Simon 
Hug, Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting, 16 STUD. PUB. CHOICE 231, 231-32 (2010).  
92 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983). It is important to note that the Court has not 
uniformly resisted such deviations 
93 Id.  
94 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986). 
95 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998). 
96 Id. (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734.  
97 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1213, 1238 (2015). 
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2.  Bespoke Starting Rules for Legislation 
 
A second sort of solution to social choice dynamics concerns the power to 
start certain kinds of legislative process as opposed to the series of required 
concurrence from various actors. There are three elements of Article 1, Section 7 
bearing this function.  
 
First, Article 1, Section 7 regimes makes the House the first mover on 
“[a]ll Bills for raising revenue”98 as a means of vesting the power of the purse 
with the more popular branch of the legislature.99 That clause also preserves the 
Senate’s power “to propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”100 The 
primary method of enforcing the Origination Clause is the House’s “blue slip” 
procedure for returning Senate-passed revenue bills to the other house.101 Judicial 
enforcement is available, but rarely invoked.102 The Court has permitted the 
Senate to exercise an expansive amendment power by suggesting that the 
judiciary lacks power “to determine whether the amendment was or was not 
outside the purposes of the original bill.”103 This construction of the Senate’s 
authority is consonant with debates at the Philadelphia Convention, during which 
delegates considered and rejected the longstanding English rule that would have 
rendered a lower house’s fiscal proposals amendment-proof.104  
 
Second, in contrast to the Origination Clause, the starting power for 
treaties resides outside Congress in the President.105 Only the president can 
negotiate with another sovereign nation; indeed, only the president can formally 
communicate with another nation for the purpose of entering into a treaty.106  
 
Third, and perhaps less noticed, the veto override provision in Article 1, 
Section 7, Clause 2, also contains a starting rule. It requires that “the House in 
                                                            
98 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 1.  
99 See Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 666 (“Delegates … used democratic principles to justify 
the Origination Clause, which gave control over initiating revenue mattes to the directly elected 
House of Representatives, rather than the Senate whose members were elected by state 
legislatures.”).  
100 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 1 
101 House Rule IX, cl. 2(a)(1) (setting forth blue slip procedure). 
102 The leading case is United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990), but it has 
produced little progeny. Earlier cases established that a bill is not covered by the Origination 
Clause unless the resulting funds were deposited in the general Treasury find. See, e.g., Millard v. 
Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1906). 
103 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914); accord Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 220 U.S. 
107, 143 (1911). 
104 Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 665-71. 
105 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
106 Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 
YALE L.J. 140, 207 (2009) [hereinafter “Hathaway, Presidential Power”] (“The President 
possesses unilateral power to negotiate an agreement with a foreign party.”). 
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which [a bill] shall have originated” vote first on a veto override.107 This role has 
entered constitutional law only obliquely as a means of glossing a separate 
constitutional rule. In the Supreme Court’s 1929 Pocket Veto Cases, the Court 
relied on the fact that “the House in which the bill originated is not in session” in 
the case at hand to construe the President’s pocket veto authority in relatively 
capacious terms.108  
 
At least at first blush, these three starting rules seem to allocate significant 
agenda-setting authority. Without the consent of a relevant gatekeeper, it would 
seem, no proposal can even embark on its legislative voyage let alone reach safe 
anchor in the U.S. Code. Whether these provisions have indeed had such a 
decisive effect is a question I take up in Part III. 
 
3. The Equilibrating Role of Political Parties 
 
A final source of structure-induced equilibrium in legislative outcomes 
can be rooted in constitutional jurisprudence, but not constitutional text. At least 
formally, Article I neither restricts the range of proposals that can be introduced 
within the congressional process nor elicits any particular pattern of voting.109 
Nevertheless, congressional preferences are distributed in a monotonic (i.e. a 
single-peaked) pattern. Empirical studies of the second half of the twentieth 
century find that a single dimension of ideological difference explains more than 
eighty-five percent of congressional voting.110 Polarization along this axis has 
increased since 2000.111 Monotonicity in Congress reduces the likelihood of 
cycling, although it does not eliminate it entirely.112   
 
The existence of monotonic congressional preferences suggests that the 
search for legislative stability can be usefully extended before the proposal of a 
                                                            
107 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. 
108 279 U.S. 655, 683 (1929). Petitioners in that case argued for a narrow reading of adjournment 
that encompassed only “the final adjournment of the Congress.” Id. at 674.The Court seemed to be 
influenced by the specificity of the sequencing rule in reading “Adjournment” broadly. Id. at 683-
84. The same result logically, though, might have obtained without a reference to specific house 
that had to act first in a veto override.  
109 In the antebellum period, Congress did used its power to set internal rules of procedure to limit 
the domain of policy questions—imposing a “gag” rule on abolitionist proposals—in order to 
preclude instability both in the Arrovian and also the more colloquial sense. DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, & POLITICS 58 (1981). 
110 Keith T. Poole & R. Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-
1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373, 397 (1985); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial 
Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 357, 368 (1985). 
111 NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE 
DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15-70 (2006). 
112 Elizabeth Maggie Penn, John W. Patty and Sean Gailmard, Manipulation and Single-
Peakedness: A General Result, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 436, 436-37 (2011). 
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bill in the House or Senate. 113  One plausible source of monotonicity in 
congressional preferences (as distinct from the general public’s preferences) is the 
binary structure of the national party system.114 A two-party system tends to 
produce policy debates with a binary structure. The existence of only two parties, 
rather than the more crowded party systems observed in other democracies, flows 
in turn from two elements of the constitutional dispensation. First, it is a function 
of a single-district electoral framework since the Founding. Famously, Duverger’s 
law predicts that a simple-majority single-ballot electoral system is very likely to 
produce a binary party system.115 This framework, though, is only partially a 
constitutional choice. At the federal level, it is necessitated solely in the post-
Seventeenth Amendment Senate.116 Notwithstanding its longstanding use, it is not 
required for the House of Representatives, which—except in states with only one 
congressional district—can be elected via multi-member districts.117  
 
Second, notwithstanding the flexibility embedded in constitutional 
districting rules, the Court has identified the preservation of a two-party system as 
a state interest that licenses harsh restrictions on third parties’ access to the 
ballot.118 The Court’s logic relied here (in a markedly circular fashion) on a worry 
about “party-splintering and excessive factionalism,”119 and has been subject to 
much criticism as a result.120 The Court, however, missed a chance to justify its 
protection of the national two-party systems by invoking the party duopoly’s 
                                                            
113 Parties are not the sole nonstate actors salient to national agenda creation. The national 
broadcast and news media—who, like political parties, are central objects of First Amendment 
solicitude—are pivotal actors in calibrating the national agenda. Unlike parties, though, they are “a 
major source of instability,” whose contributions conduce to “surges” and “lurch[es]” in policy 
focus. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 103, 125.  
114 See Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 74, at 980; Grofman, supra note 52, at 1554 (“A 
two-party system creates a largely single-dimensional competition within the legislature.”). It is 
worth stressing that what requires explanation here is the distribution of congressional preferences, 
not popular preferences. That is, the public may or may not have monotonic preferences. Provided 
the constitutional system of representation translate those views into a monotonic array of 
legislative preferences, cycling will be dampened.  
115 MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE 
MODERN STATE 216-28 (Barbara & Robert North trans., Methuen 1954) (1951) (proposing that a 
simple majority electoral system strongly favors a two-party status quo). 
116 U.S. CONST. amd XVII. 
117 For judicial consideration of multimember congressional districts, see, e.g., White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (multimember districts not necessarily unconstitutional); accord 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159-60 (1971). 
118 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (“[T] he States' 
interest [in political stability] permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in 
practice, favor the traditional two-party system.”).  
119 Id. at 367 
120 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not 
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. 
CT. REV. 331, 342-44 (1997).  
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tendency to induce monotonic legislative preferences.121 Stability of a social 
choice flavor, therefore, might be invoked to underwrite constitutional solicitude 
for the two-party system. That stability, moreover, may not emerge if alternative 
modalities of political choice were adopted in lieu of a two-party duopoly. In 
response, the critics of the party duopoly’s constitutional status might point to the 
interaction between the party system and bicameralism. During periods of 
interparty polarization, where the gap between the median member of each party 
is large, it will be much more difficult to locate legislation that can survive every 
veto-gate created by Article I, Section 7. Over the past three decades, legislative 
inaction has increased in lockstep with increasing party polarization.122 Stalemate, 
that is, flows from the interaction of two stability-inducing structures: our two-
party duopoly characterized by ideologically distinct options and the thicket of 
concurrence rules populating Article I, Section 7. These interactions, which 
conduce to a supernumerary degree of stability, may justify loosening either one 
of the two design margins. 
 
Although my focus here is the separation of powers, it is worth noting in 
passing that the choice between party-based and popular agenda-setting 
instruments also arises at the state level, in part because institutional 
experimentation is more readily feasible than at the federal level. Among the 
states, the popular initiative process has been used as a workaround of an 
entrenched party system.123 Whether this workaround has provided successful is 
the object of debate.124 Most recently, the choice between party-based and popular 
agenda control was starkly at issue in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission [“ARIC”], which formally concerned 
Arizona’s allocation of redistricting authority to an independent commission.125 
That commission was formed to “en[d] the practice of gerrymandering and 
                                                            
121 Duopolies, notwithstanding the criticism to which they have been subject, are perhaps 
preferable to other instruments for limiting the domain of expressed political preferences. See, e.g., 
David Levi, The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 
79. 887-89 (1989) (positing the classical Athenian practice of ostracism as a method of restricting 
domain).  
122 Sarah Binder, Polarized we Govern? 10, fig.3 (May 2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/27%20polarized%20we%20gov
ern%20binder/brookingscepm_polarized.pdf; see also Sarah A. Binder, Stalemate: Causes and 
Consequences of Legislative Gridlock 41 (2003) (reporting an earlier round of findings on 
stalemates).  
123 THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND 
RECALL 2-6 (1989).  
124 Because access to the initiative process depends largely on fiscal resources needed to organize 
the necessary signature campaigns, it is thus quite possible to imagine strategic agenda 
manipulation and cycling among proponents of different initiatives. Elizabeth Garrett, Money, 
Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1850-51 & 1862 (1999) (exploring 
signature thresholds and other fiscal barriers to entry in the initiative process).  
125 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015) (holding that Article I, § 4, clause 1 does not bar 
congressional redistricting by independent commission). 
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improving voter and candidate participation in elections” by moving the starting 
power in redistricting matters out of legislative hands into putatively more 
independent hands.126 ARIC illustrates how agenda setting can emerge in the 
federalism as well as the separation of powers context because of elements the 
federal constitutional order that seem to distinguish between different institutions 
within a state. 
 
C. Agenda Control within the Executive Branch 
  
This section first explores two ways in which the Constitution parcels out 
agenda-control power between Article I and II, in regard first to policy-making 
and then to appointments. As a way of showing the analytic traction obtained by 
the agenda-control lens, I further analyze internal executive-branch organization, 
especially the creation of multimember agencies, in terms of agenda-setting 
problematics.  
1. Starting Rules and the Executive 
  
In most domains where the Constitution divides authority between the 
executive and Congress, Congress has the “exclusive” starting power as a matter 
of course.127 As Justice Black stated in his Youngstown plurality opinion, “[i]n 
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”128 The necessity 
for and temporal “primacy of the Article I lawmaking process”129 over executive 
action is implicit in Article II’s command that the president “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”130 The Youngstown case itself, which is a bedrock 
of contemporary separation of powers jurisprudence, is often taken to stand for 
the proposition that “the President not only cannot act contra legem, he or she 
must point to affirmative legislative authorization when so acting.”131 
Congressional starting power is underscored and reinforced in three 
different ways in the Constitution’s text and case-law. First, specific elements of 
                                                            
126 Id. at 2662 (noting that the independent commission was created to “en[d] the practice of 
gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate participation in elections” (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)).  
127Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (Black, J., plurality op.); 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319 (2001) (“Basic 
separation of powers doctrine maintains that Congress must authorize presidential exercises of 
essentially lawmaking functions.”). The creation of treaties, noted above, is an exception. 
128 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89 (noting “exclusive constitutional authority to make laws 
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution). 
129 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative 
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2134 (2008) 
130 U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.  
131 Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993). 
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the Constitution’s text reiterate the primacy of congressional action. The Declare 
War Clause,132 for example, appears to repose in Congress the power to initiate 
armed hostilities and then to regulate comprehensively their execution, 133 
although it is generally believed that the Framers intended the presidency to have 
power to “repel sudden attacks” on its own initiative.134 Notwithstanding this 
exception, there is “no mistaking … the Constitution's broad textual commitment 
to Congress's key role in the war-making system.”135  
Second, the Court has developed lines of jurisprudence to preserve, to 
greater or lesser extents, legislative primacy in determining the content of federal 
policy. The more successful judicial intervention—perhaps so successful that it 
has now been largely forgotten—concerns the criminal law. Article I does not 
mention a specific congressional power to criminalize quotidian matters. 136 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the federal government has the power to 
impose criminal punishment, and yet that the executive has no power to initiate a 
criminal prosecution in the absence of a legislative authority. At the time of the 
Founding, however, a federal prosecutor or judge could rely on a common law of 
crimes.137 The executive’s ability to rely on a repository of common law offenses 
invested it with a sort of starting power in respect to the criminal law. It was only 
in 1812 that the Supreme Court rejected that inheritance of common-law criminal 
offenses from colonial practice.138 Extinguishing the federal common law of 
                                                            
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power to ... declare War ....”). 
133 Although there is some controversy on this point, the best historical accounts stress the 
pervasive extent of congressional authority. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947 
(2008) (“Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle (and the conduct and 
organization of the armed forces and militia more generally”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The 
Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2015) (making a 
“case for expansive congressional power “ in respect to “domestic wars”). 
134 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 475-77 
(Norton 1966) (1840); see also Raoul Berger, War-Making By the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 
29, 40-43 (1972) (analyzing those debates). 
135 Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of 
Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 453 (2011). 
136 Indeed, a committed textualist ought to infer the opposite result. The Constitution assigns 
Congress power to “define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and 
offenses against the law of nations.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10. Reading Article I as 
exclusive—as the Court has done in Chadha, Bowsher, and like jurisprudence—leads to the 
conclusion that the federal government has no power to criminalize.  
137 That common law of crime was recognized in eight federal circuits in the 1790s. see Gary D. 
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, 
and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J . 919, 920 n.8 (1992) (collecting 
cases); see also Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the 
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 263 (1986) (mapping 
debates about the federal common law of crime). 
138 United States v Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812). 
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substantive crimes in effect restored starting power to Congress, depriving the 
executive of the power to take the initiative.  
Finally, robust protection of congressional first-mover prerogatives in the 
domestic policy domain implies careful policing of the boundary between 
enforcing an enacted statute and using that statute as a springboard for 
independent policymaking. An “intelligible principle” from Congress was, and 
technically still is, required to guide any exercise of executive branch 
discretion.139 The extent of congressional agenda-setting power is measured in 
inverse proportion to the enforcement—or, as explored further below, non-
enforcement140—of that specification demand. Among its other effects, failure to 
enforce a non-delegation rule in an era of broad agency rulemaking authority 
would mean that the status quo sheltered by bicameralism and presentment141 is 
more likely to be comprised of Article II-calibrated norms. 
Even when the Court recognizes a domain of threshold executive-branch 
authority, it also stresses residual pathways for congressional control. For 
example, describing the exclusive presidential power to recognize foreign 
sovereigns in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry—in effect, an allocation of 
starting power to the president rather than Congress—the Court cautioned that it 
did “not question the substantial powers of Congress over foreign affairs in 
general or passports in particular.”142 Hence, it would seem that the Constitution 
would generally require the legislative branch of Article I to be the first mover.143  
2. Appointments as a Form of Agenda Setting 
 
Once regulatory statutes are enacted, the manner in which they are 
enforced often turns on decisions made by federal agencies’ leadership. The 
mechanism for appointing senior officials to those agencies, therefore, acts as a 
                                                            
139 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). For a contemporary 
application, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (rejecting a 
nondelegation challenge under the intelligible principle rule). 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 203 to 206. 
141 See supra text accompanying notes 80 to 91. 
142 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015); see also id. at 2090 (“For it is Congress that makes laws, and in 
countless ways its laws will and should shape the Nation's course. The Executive is not free from 
the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”). 
143 An exception is Dames & Moore v. Regan, in which the Court could point to no law that 
authorized its dismissal of private contract claims pending in U.S. courts against Iran. 452 U.S. 
654, 686 (1981). Professors Manning and Goldsmith argue more generally that the President has 
“a discretion that is neither dictated nor meaningfully channeled by legislative command.” Jack 
Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2308 
(2006), Most of their examples—rulemaking, the executive of prosecutorial discrimination in the 
criminal context, deference to agency interpretations of regulatory statutes—arise within the four 
corners of a legislative authorization, and so are strained and inapposite of the claimed completion 
power.  
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subsequent moment for influencing the federal policy agenda. By alternating 
either zealous or reluctant agencies heads, political leaders can recalibrate agency 
enforcement efforts. Appointments to federal agencies, therefore, provide a 
second agenda-setting mechanism in the regulatory domain after the enactment of 
a statute.144    
 
The constitutional scheme for appointments of both officials and federal 
judges is “a mirror image” of default rule in other settings. “Whereas Article I 
empowers the Congress to set the legislative agenda, the Appointments Clause 
grants agenda-setting power to the president on appointments matters.”145 Indeed, 
Article II of the Constitution vests presidents with indefeasible control over the 
selection of “principal officers” subject to possible rejection by the Senate.146 
Article II further grants the president power to make “recess” appointments 
without a Senate vote.147 One study of appointments to twelve agencies between 
1945 and 2000 found that 12 percent were made without Senate advice and 
consent, with presidents Eisenhower, Truman, and Reagan using the tactic most 
frequently.148 In its recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Court defined 
the president’s power to extend to all breaks in legislative proceedings more than 
three days in length, without regard to when the vacancy first arose.149 Although 
some commentators have characterized Noel Canning as a “broad” construction 
of presidential power,150 the ultimate effect of the opinion likely hinges on the 
Senate’s willingness to recess in ways that triggers presidential appointive power. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to generalize to the effect that the president has 
starting power in respect to most important federal appointments.   
 
                                                            
144 The appointments power is only one of a series of instruments possessed by the President for 
influencing regulatory outcomes. Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 25-33 (2013) (canvassing those instruments). It is, however, the only one that is identified in the 
Constitution’s text.  
145 Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward A Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments 
Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 481 (1998). 
146 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–37 (1976) (per curiam) 
(describing effect of Appointments Clause and holding that Congress cannot appoint officers). 
147 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
148 Pamela C. Corley, Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential 
Power, 36 PRES. STUD. Q. 670, 676 (2006). 
149 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558-73 (2014) (describing a relatively broad account 
of the Recess Appointment power). 
150 Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the Original 
Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 892 (2015) 
(“When combined with the broad view as to when a vacancy happens, this interpretation allows 
the President to make a recess appointment for any vacant office during the six to ten legislative 
breaks of ten days or more that typically occur each year.”). 
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3.  The Design of Federal Agencies  
 
Arrow’s theorem and its successors might seem to suggest that instability 
will be limited to the plural branches—Congress and the federal judiciary—while 
the “unitary executive”151 will evade its perils. If allocating decisions to the 
executive obviated the trade-offs identified in social choice theory, then this might 
provide a powerful reason for allocating larger authority to Article II rather than 
to Article I or Article III. Indeed, it is certainly true that the hierarchical structure 
of an executive branch peaked with a singular head provides at least one 
putatively instability-proof channel for policy choice.152 But not all decision-
making in the executive branch is channeled through a singular vessel. Article II 
provides no safe harbor from instability. 
 
There are two reasons to believe instability is a more substantial 
possibility in executive branch decision-making than is commonly realized. First, 
the Constitution does not assume that the president will shoulder the task of 
translating law into policy on its own. The opinions clause of Article II, to the 
contrary, assumes a multiplicity of “departments” in a hierarchical relationship 
with the president.153 Many important decisions taken by the executive branch 
implicate several different agencies and are reached through either formal or 
“informal and relatively invisible.154 Some statutes contain what Jody Freeman 
and Jim Rossi call “concurrence requirements” that make interagency agreement a 
                                                            
151 The unitary executive theory of Article II of the Constitution holds that the President must have 
“the power to supervise and control all subordinate executive officials exercising executive power 
conferred explicitly by either the Constitution or a valid statute.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1177 n.119 (1992). Were the unitary executive theory to hold in practice (which even its 
proponents do not claim), it might stifle some, but not all, the institutional features that conduce to 
instability in decision-making within the executive. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541, 581-82 (1994) (setting 
forth implications of the theory for independent agencies). 
152 Quantitative studies of presidential control of regulatory agencies, however, have identified 
plurality even in White House influences. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.”’ (citation omitted)). 
153 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (empowering the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of 
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties 
of their respective Offices”) 
154 J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2232 
(2005) (claiming that “[a] great deal of interagency communication occurs in the administrative 
state”). A weaker form of collective choice has been identified in the adjudicative context. See 
Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 813 
(2015) (“Resolving administrative claims often involves interagency coordination throughout the 
process. Agencies coordinate throughout their investigations and claim development by sharing 
both facts and legal analyses with one another.”).  
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prerequisite of regulatory intervention, 155  much as Article I requires the 
concurrence of several elected bodies before a proposal becomes law. Even absent 
a formal interagency process, the regulatory process creates opportunities for 
instability to enter executive decision-making.  Part of the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affair’s (OIRA’s) function, for instance, is to manage “a 
genuinely interagency process.”156 Whenever this entails more than two agencies 
debating over more than two possible policy choices, there is an act of collective 
choice that must be reached through some decision rule—a decision rule that risks 
instability and incoherence. 
 
Second, the design of post-New Deal regulatory agencies has often been 
motivated by a concern that the agency will succeed to the influence of “well-
financed and politically influential special interest groups.”157 One of the agency 
design choices thought to hinder capture is multiplicity. There are by one recent 
count forty-three federal agencies captained by multimember boards.158 The plural 
structure of these agencies’ leadership means their decisions are vulnerable to the 
incoherence and instability dynamics identified in the social choice literature. It is 
also worth noting that about half of these multimember boards are statutorily 
required to show “partisan balance” in their composition.159 This means that these 
boards tend to have more heterogeneous preferences than might otherwise be 
anticipated,160 which means they have a less restricted domain of choices; as a 
result, they will tend to be more vulnerable to instability.161 The choice between 
such multimember boards and single-headed agencies, therefore, implicates a 
trade-off between the risk of capture and the risk of instability or paralysis.  
 
                                                            
155 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131, 1160-61 (2012). 
156 Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1841 (2013). 
157 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010); see also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight 
of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006) (“[More recent explanations of 
agency capture] look to how agencies cooperate with interest groups in order to procure needed 
information, political support, and guidance; the more one-sided that information, support, and 
guidance, the more likely that agencies will act favorably toward the dominant interest group.”).  
158 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 792 (2013).  
159 Id. at 797-99; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et. al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the 
Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 962-72 (2015) (tracing the historical usage 
of partisan balance requirements back to the 1862 Utah Commission).  
160 For a celebration of this characteristic that fails to note the effect of decisional stability, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 
(2000) (“An independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize toward 
an extreme position …. A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against 
movements of this kind.”). 
161 To the best I can tell, the only scholar to apply social choice theory in this context is Mayton, 
supra note 87, at 961-62. 
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In summary, problems of agenda control are endemic across the federal 
government. Article II supplies no escape route from the trade-offs presented by 
social choice theory by dint of the unitary nature of its textual design.  
 
D. Agenda Control and the Judiciary 
 
A multimember national judiciary, like a plural legislature, faces both the 
problem of selecting questions to address from a large background population of 
potential disputes, and then the difficulty of overcoming Arrovian instability in 
decision-making processes. The Constitution contains two agenda-setting 
mechanisms for judicial action: first, the congressional power to calibrate the 
scope of federal-court jurisdiction and second, the reticulated doctrine of standing 
inferred from the text of Article III.  
 
1. Jurisdictional Calibration as Agenda Control 
 
Like the domain of potential objects of government regulation, the 
universe of potential disputes amenable to federal-court resolution is too large to 
be compassed by the federal judiciary. Scarcity of adjudicative resources has 
implications both for the settlement function of the U.S. Supreme Court and also 
the more retail dispute-resolution service offered in district courts.  
 
The Supreme Court is not centrally concerned with the resolution of 
individuals’ disputes. It rather endeavors to resolve legal questions of wide-
ranging importance.162 At the same time, the Court lacks the resources, and 
perhaps the political support,163 to decide all constitutional questions of large 
national significance. In contrast, federal district courts are engaged in a distinct 
kind of routinized resolution of granular individual disputes, the vast majority of 
which lack national resonance. Yet like the Supreme Court, federal district courts 
cannot possible handle all potentially justiciable disputes.164 Even in the limited 
domain of constitutional disputes, the volume of routine government actions that 
                                                            
162 Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1385 (1997) (emphasizing Supreme Court's role “as the authoritative settler 
of constitutional meaning”). 
163 The leading empirical studies of the Court’s “diffuse” support find a reservoir o public support 
that the Court can draw upon. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta 
Spence, Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 
355 (2003) (documenting (providing data on support of the Supreme Court from 1973 to 2000); 
see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in 
the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1220-23 (1986) (charting changes in confidence 
in Court from the late 1960s to the early 1980s). 
164 For an example of judicial awareness of this point, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 
2080 (2011) (“Courts should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve 
difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on 
the outcome of the case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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might be characterized as violations of due process or equal protection norms 
means that lower courts need docket management tools to staunch a potentially 
overwhelming flow of litigation.165 
 
In the first instance, the Constitution reposes the power to shape the 
judicial agenda in Congress’s hand.166 Congress not only has threshold authority 
to determine whether lower courts exist at all,167 but also can carve “Exceptions, 
and . . . Regulations” to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.168 Since 
it’s founding, Congress has modulated both the extent of lower court jurisdiction 
and also Supreme Court settlement authority in response to changing social, 
political, and ideological demands.169 Since the antebellum period, the Court has 
recognized broad congressional power over lower-court jurisdiction. 170 
Regulation of the high court’s appellate jurisdiction triggers more heated 
controversy. 171  Today, the Supreme Court exercises almost complete 
discretionary authority over the exercise of that appellate jurisdiction via the use 
of the certiorari system—but it is easy to forget that certiorari was a congressional 
                                                            
165 The Supreme Court has recognized this volume problem most explicitly in the context of 
constitutional tort litigation. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986) (holding 
that “random and unauthorized” actions cannot violate the Due Process Clause); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (extending Parratt’s exhaustion principle to intentional torts). It is 
arguable that anxieties about docket management have shaped the landscape of constitutional 
remedies more generally. See Aziz Z Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of 
Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L. J. 1 (2015) [hereinafter “Huq, Judicial Independence”]. 
166 Extrapolating from discussions of the power of downstream veto-gates to influence earlier 
participants’ strategic choices in a multistage decisional process, it might be posited that Congress 
also influences the judiciary’s distribution of adjudicative resources via the threat of a legislative 
override. Recent research concern patterns of the Supreme Court certiorari grants between 1953 
and 1993, however, obtains a null result for that kind of anticipatory effect. Ryan J. Owens, The 
Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 419-24 (2010). 
Hence, Congress’s influence appears to be purely ex ante in operation. 
167 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 715-18 (1998) 
(describing how “the Madisonian Compromise, letting Congress decide whether to appoint 
inferior tribunals” emerged at the Philadelphia convention). 
168 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The Court’s original jurisdiction is sufficiently exiguous to be of 
little practical significance.  
169 For a detailed history of jurisdictional development in both the lower courts and the apex 
tribunal, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012). 
170 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1850) (upholding the power of Congress to 
restrict the scope of diversity jurisdiction). With a handful of exceptions, there is also an academic 
consensus that “Congress has very broad power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts, as long as the Supreme Court retains appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
initially litigated in state court.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1043, 1093 (2010). 
171 Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated 
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895-97 (1984) (documenting that history). 
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choice, one that can be presumptively unraveled by legislative hands.172 The fact 
that Constitution reposes agenda control power for the judiciary in the elected 
branches has engendered much anxiety and hand-wringing among scholars.173 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a definitive statement to the contrary from the 
Court, the text of the Article III would seem to vest the legislature with tolerably 
broad authority to determine which constitutional questions of national import end 
up on the judiciary’s agenda.174  
 
2.  Justiciability Doctrine as Agenda Control 
 
A second species of agenda control power lies with the courts rather than 
Congress. The Justices have authority to develop doctrine that selects between 
litigants in ways that shape the flow of issues presented in subsequent periods. I 
use the example of standing doctrine here, but a parallel point might be made with 
many other doctrines, including ripeness, mootness, and the elaborate judge-made 
structures of state sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has read the words 
“case” and “controversy” in Article III to limit the class of cognizable disputes. 
One element of the ensuing body of justiciability doctrine concerns the standing 
of plaintiffs to seek judicial redress.175 It is typically said that standing’s central 
function is “ensure that the people most directly concerned are able to litigate the 
questions at issue.”176 But in a pair of insightful articles, Maxwell Stearns has 
adduced another, quite ingenious explanation for standing doctrine: these rules 
constitute a judicially fashioned source of structure-induced equilibrium.177 A 
further inference from Stearns logic is the use of stare decisis to limit the 
emergence of cycling by making a first resolution of an issue presumptively 
                                                            
172 Congress first reposed significant discretionary authority in the Court’s own hands over the 
content of its appellate docket in the Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §6, 26 Stat. 826, 
828, a discretion expanded in later statutes, see, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; 
Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
173 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953). 
174 For a textual argument to this effect, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997).  
175 Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009) (framing the “critical question [in standing 
analysis as] whether at least one petitioner has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks 
and emphasis omitted)). 
176 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988). The black-letter 
law of standing is now calcified in the three-part test of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility 
enunciated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992); see also Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (describing the tripartite Lujan test as a “hard floor”). 
177 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 
(1995) [hereinafter “Stearns, Historical Evidence”]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the 
Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, 
Justiciability]. 
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conclusive, even when a majority might exist to overturn it, provides another 
guarantor of stability in judicial outcomes.  
  
 The potential for Arrovian instability arises whenever a multimember 
must select among more than two alternative rules: Arrow’s theorem holds that a 
majority votes sequentially and pairwise for A over B, B over C, and A over C.178  
Absent some constraint on the reconsideration of A, a Court facing these 
alternatives can “continue to cycle indefinitely, leading to a stalemate.” 179 
Alternatively, if previously defeated options are eliminated from consideration by 
the doctrine of stare decisis, “the power to set the agenda, meaning the power to 
determine the order in which options are presented for voting” will be outcome 
dispositive.180 Courts are vulnerable to a second kind of instability called the 
doctrinal paradox. This arises when a collective entity forms a judgment on a 
single matter based on numerous sub-issues, but different ultimate results are 
obtained by a single all-or-nothing vote versus seriatim issue-by-issue voting over 
sub-issues.181 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently confronted a dispute in 
which outcome-voting and issue-voting in an antitrust case would have resulted in 
different results because of three judges’ views on an antitrust standing and an 
antitrust merits question.182 (That case is unusual, perhaps, because of the judges 
recognized the doctrinal paradox, and provided cogent discussions of how it 
should be resolved). In at least one case, moreover, it is arguably that a Justice 
(perhaps strategically) decided to switch from outcome-based voting to issue-
voting for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a case.183 
 Standing rules, Stearns ingeniously argues, do not entirely extinguish 
instability in multimember courts. Rather, standing rules tether access to the 
federal courthouse to a set of facts—injury-in-fact—largely outside the control of 
individual litigants.184 Stearns thus characterizes the injury-in-fact element of 
standing doctrine as “likely beyond” the power of even powerful interest groups 
                                                            
178 For examples, see Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 177, at 1335-39 (providing an 
example from standing doctrine).  
179 Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 177, at 1339. 
180 Id. at 1340, 1347; see also id. at 1353 (describing the stabilizing role of stare decisis); Stearns, 
Justiciability, supra note 177, at 1314-15 (same); Saul Levmore, Public Choice and Law's 
Either/or Inclination, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1663, 1663-64 (2012) (noting that “judicial results might 
depend on the order in which cases are considered”). 
181 See Christian List, The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions, 24 SOC. 
CHOICE & WELFARE 3, 4-5 (2005) (detailing doctrinal paradox); Lewis A. Kornhauser & 
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
11-12 (1993) (applying it legal doctrine). 
182 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 189 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(Ambro, J., concurring). 
183 Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 84 (2003) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s vote in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279 (1991)). 
184 Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 177, at 1551.  
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seeking judicial ratification of a non-Condorcet-winner rule. 185  Standing 
doctrine’s injury-on-fact rule, in Stearns’ view, therefore prevents interest groups 
from engaging in “advertent or ideological path manipulation.”186 It thus shifts 
agenda control power away from litigants, whose privilege to litigate depends on 
judges’ willingness to recognize a given injury. On this account, standing does not 
supply a guarantee that a Condorcet winner (if one exists) will emerge from a 
sequence of litigated cases or that the particular order in which issues arises does 
not influence the final equilibrium reached by the Court. Nor will it prevent 
Justices from exploiting the doctrinal paradox.187  
 In sum, the institutional responses to Arrovian instability in the judiciary 
are a blend of interbranch and precedential tools. Congressional regulation of 
lower court jurisdiction—the bounds of which have constantly shifted over time 
as Congress has hemmed in or let out the judicial role in response to fluctuating 
social demands—determines the range of issues that federal courts can confront 
from among the heterogeneous world of potential legal questions. Standing and 
stare decisis doctrines, in contrast, might be explained as efforts to prevent certain 
forms of strategic action and induce a minimum of stability. Notably, neither form 
of agenda-control device precludes strategic flipping between outcome-voting and 
issue-voting, strategic decisions to grant or deny certiorari review,188 or other 
retail judicial efforts to shape the law by leveraging agenda control power.   
 
                                                            
185 Id. at 1362 (“Standing promotes adherence to the majoritarian norm by preventing, at least 
presumptively, non-Cordorcet minority from forcing its preferences into law through the 
judiciary.”); see also Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 177, at 1395-96 (asserting that the injury-
in-fact rule “properly understood, is not really about injury at all. Instead, the term “injury” is a 
metaphor. The relevant inquiry in comparing these cases is whether the facts alleged are sufficient 
to overcome the burden of congressional inertia”). Where the judiciary’s preferences diverge from 
those of the general public, however, standing might not have that democracy promoting effect 
that Stearns envisages. Instead, standing may prevent Condorcet majorities in the general 
population from manipulating the order in which issues are presented to a Court in order to ensure 
that the popular median preference, not the judicial median preference, becomes law.  
186 Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 177, at 1400-01. The Supreme Court’s discretion in respect to 
whether to grant review via a petition for certiorari, Stearns notes, is subject to potential 
manipulation by the Justices, and cannot prevent the manipulation of jurisprudential paths in the 
federal appellate courts. Id. at 1350-53.  
187 Nash argues that “courts do not adhere to a strict outcome-based voting regime but rather 
follow a modified outcome-based voting protocol,” and that this regime, coupled with restraints on 
interlocutory appeals, increases the frequency with which the doctrinal paradox can arise. Nash, 
supra note 183, at 84-89. As a result, the doctrinal instability can emerge in and across cases.  
188 For evidence that the voting on certiorari petitions is informed by strategic, policy-focused 
considerations, see Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The 
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1072 (2009) (finding based on a study of a 
random sample of 358 noncapital petitions, that “Justices grant review when they believe that the 
policy outcome of their merits decision will be better ideologically for them than the status quo”). 
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E. A Taxonomy of the Constitution’s Agenda Control Mechanisms 
 
This Part has demonstrated that the Constitution contains a wide array of 
agenda-setting rules within the separation of powers domain alone. These devices 
respond either to capacity constraints and the need to select only a slice of issues 
for government intervention and also to the immanent specter of instability in 
collective choice mechanisms. Agenda control instruments in the Constitution 
also work in diverse ways, assigning power to a range of actors inside and outside 
the Constitution. In the aggregate, they comprise a central element of our 
Constitution’s design.  
  
The heterogeneity of agenda control devices found in the Constitution, 
however, should not deflect analysis. Despite their diversity, it is possible to 
organize those diverse instruments of institutional design into a tolerable, simple 
taxonomical framework—one that should enable further analysis. The agenda 
control instruments adumbrated above can be usefully organized according to 
three parameters: (1) starting powers v. concurrence powers; (2) intramural v. 
external powers; and (3) state v. nonstate actors. Institutional designers can 
advance different goals, I suggest, by toggling between these various options. 
This section sets forth those different design choices, as illuminated in the 
Constitution’s text. It further sets forth variations within some of those large 
categories. 
 
The first margin concerns the timing of an agenda setter’s power, in 
particular whether that power entails the ability to start a decisional process, or 
whether it is a subsequent power to concur that is conditional on another actor’s 
decision to set in motion a process. Starting powers are constitutional 
endowments to select an issue from the array of possible objects of government 
regulation and to initiate policy-making on that topic. Moreover, the starting 
powers in the Constitution come in two flavors: they can be either complete or 
contingent.  A contingent starting power entails the ability to offer a proposal 
subject to rejection or amendment by another actor. The House’s origination 
authority and the President’s appointment have this aspect. In both instances, the 
starting power does not exhaust the preconditions for legal efficacy. On the other 
hand, a complete starting power entails a power to not just make a proposal, but 
also to preclude any stalling or veto. The presidential “recognition power” 
described in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,”189 for example, allows the 
executive to present the other branches with a fait accompli with immediate legal 
and diplomatic consequences.190 Similarly, the recess appointment power is a 
                                                            
189 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084-85 (2015). 
190 Id. (recognizing “[l]egal consequences,” including the recognized sovereign’s right to sue, to 
claim sovereign immunity, act-of-state immunity, and noting that recognition is “a precondition of 
regular diplomatic relations”). 
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complete, if temporally bounded, power to invest a person with the legal powers 
and perquisites of a federal office.191  
 
Concurrence powers are conditional on another institution’s power to 
initiate state action. At least formally, the Constitutional text seems to assign 
concurrence powers to the president (who can veto legislation), the Senate (which 
can resist treaties) and the judiciary (which must shape the mandate engrafted into 
jurisdictional legislation). Concurrence powers might further be dichotomized as 
either plenary or partial. A plenary concurrence power allows an office-holder 
not merely to stop a proposal, but also to alter it. The Senate’s role under the 
Origination Clause has this aspect, as does the Court’s discretionary control of its 
own appellate jurisdiction.192 In other cases, a concurrence power is partial 
insofar as it only permits approval or disapproval of the first mover’s proposal 
without substitution of an alternative. The Senate’s role in the appointments 
process has this character. These terms, plenary and partial, are useful heuristics 
describing end-points of a range, not precise descriptions. To see this, consider 
how Congress’s lawmaking power should be characterized. On the one hand, 
Congress’s super-majoritarian power to enact laws over a presidential veto might 
be seen as an effectively complete power. Where Congress eliminates a criminal 
penalty or authorizes private behavior, in particular, the executive can do little to 
resist. But when Congress’s intended policy change depends on executive-branch 
action, legislative power looks more partial.  
 
The second design decision focuses upon the choice between intramural 
versus external assignment of agenda control. An intramural agenda control 
power is one that assigns to a single entity the power to select among potential 
policy pathways, and also the power to act upon that choice. For example, the 
President’s recess appointment power is intramural insofar as it allows the 
executive branch to exercise control at a key veto-gate over regulatory policy.193 
Similarly, the new-minted recognition power of Zivotofsky is also an intramural 
instrument of agenda control: it dictates which of several potential diplomatic 
stances the United States will adopt toward diverse international counterparties.194 
                                                            
191 A recess appointment “shall expire at the end of their next session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 
3. What of the power to appoint inferior officers? 
192 The Court reserves the authority to reframe the questions presented by a given petition, 
EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 459-61 (9th ed. 2007), a power that it uses 
with increasing frequency, Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and 
Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 689 (2012) (criticizing the practice). 
193 It is precisely the ensuing institutional amalgam of agenda control and power to act, indeed, 
that generates suspicion among many commentators. Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the 
Age of Regulation, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1523, 1555 (2013) (worrying, in the recess appointment 
context, that “concentrated power often results in the loss of liberty”). 
194 A weak form of endogenous agenda control device, which falls at the boundary of this paper’s 
scope, is each house’s power to set its own rules. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl 2. Those rules 
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And it is possible to see standing doctrine as a kind of intramural agenda-control 
device. In one prominent account, standing doctrine is a fabrication of liberal 
Justices during the New Deal seeking to insulate regulatory initiatives from 
judicial unsettling.195 That is, standing is an invention of the federal courts 
grounded in an ingenuous reading of isolate text fragments from the 
Constitution—an autochthonic mechanism for self-regulating the order of cases 
presented for judicial resolution.   
 
By contrast, an external agenda control power is one that divides between 
entities (a) the power to propose or vote on a matter, and (b) the power to act 
upon that matter. It is perhaps unsurprising that a Constitution that consciously 
positions institutional powers to check and balance each other196 would frequently 
split the power to propose from the power to act. Across Congress and the 
executive, it is the executive that is empowered to act, but Congress alone that can 
propose a policy. Examples of external powers include the president’s power to 
nominate Article III judges, the Senate’s point to block principal officer 
appointments, and Congress’s authority to enact jurisdictional statutes.  
The third and final distinction to draw is between the exercise of agenda-
setting power by a state actor, as opposed to a person plainly outside the state 
apparatus but operating under a constitutional license. The lion’s share of 
examples supplied in Part II, of course, concerns allocations of power within the 
three federal branches. In descriptive legislative agenda-setting, I identified 
political parties as central stabilizing forces. To this one might add the role of the 
media as an agenda-setting, although one more prone to dis-equilibriating effects 
than stability.197  
 
 Table 2 summarizes the resulting taxonomy of agenda control devices 
found in the Constitution. Examples are provided for each taxonomical cell for 
which they are available (with italics used to indicate those institutional design 
possibilities that have been struck down by the Court on constitutional grounds).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
determine who in Congress has power to block proposed legislation, and thus has important 
outcome-related consequences.  
195 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1436-38 (1988) (advancing the thesis of standing as an invention of liberal Justices), with 
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical 
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 695-967 (2010) (finding 
that “the insulation thesis does not fully explain the conception or invention of the modern 
standing doctrine”). 
196 For a canonical statement of this position, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per 
curiam). 
197 See supra note 113. 
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Table 2. A Taxonomy of Agenda Control Mechanisms 
 
 State Actors Nonstate 
Actor 
 
 Intramural	 External 
Starting 
Power 
The President’s recess 
appointment power 
The President’s treaty 
powers 
The proposing chamber 
in veto override votes 
Standing doctrine 
Congress’s power to enact 
bills 
Congress’s control of 
federal-court jurisdiction 










The President’s veto 
Line-item veto 
 
The Senate’s role in fiscal 
legislation 
The Senate’s role in 




As diverse as the options arrayed on Table 2 are, the variety of agenda-
setting rules in the U.S. context hardly exhausts the field. To the contrary, there 
are many devices for agenda control that do not appear in this enumeration. 
Consider, for example, the mechanism for setting the legislative agenda in fifth 
century B.C. Athens, in the wake of Cleisthenes’ democratic reforms. Athenian 
legislative power was partitioned between an Assembly, open to all who chose to 
attend on a give day, and a Council of 500, whose paid members were chosen by 
lot and limited to two years’ service.198  The Council had the power to set the 
Assembly’s agenda, in the sense of defining the issues under consideration.199 The 
effect of this system was to split the power to establish the threshold set of 
questions under deliberation from final decisional authority. Moreover, the 
randomization rule for selecting Council members, in tandem with a term limit, 
can be understood as a means to rein in strategic use of the power to set threshold 
agendas.200 Today, “random processes are virtually never found in parliamentary 
law,” even though order-mandating rules are in effect “often … a randomizing 
element.”201 This suggests that there are plausible and tractable design opinions 
                                                            
198 JOSIAH OBER, THE ATHENIAN REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 25 (1996). 
199 Id.; see also JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION: INNOVATION AND 
LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 142-51 (2008) (describing the geographical roots and structure 
of the Council, and noting the effect of term limits on preventing “a self-serving identity or 
corporate culture”).  
200 Once a question had been proposed, the assembly did not count votes, but instead employed 
cheriotonia (a rough hand count) or even thorubus (acclamation by shouts). Melissa 
Schwartzberg, Shouts, Murmurs and Votes: Acclamation and Aggregation in Ancient Greece, 18 
J. POL. PHIL. 448, 464 (2010). Probabilistic modes of aggregation of this kind obscured cycles, 
likely making the Council’s agenda-setting role even more significant.  
201 Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 74, at 990 n.57. Adam Samaha identifies the military 
draft, randomized experiments in welfare policy in the 1960s, and federal land-grant lotteries, as 
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that have yet to be explored in the American context.202 The diversity of observed 
agenda control modalities in contemporary constitutional law, in short, should not 
preclude experimentation with novel instruments for clarifying the focus on 
government action and resolving instability when government acts.  
 
III. The Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control  
 
 The Framers’ inclusion of a mechanism in the original constitutional text 
is no guarantee of persistence. This Part revisits the allocation of agenda-control 
powers between the three branches to consider how well the Framers’ 
constitutional allocation of agenda-control powers has fared. In brief, the careful 
distribution of agenda-control powers described in Part II has not fared well: 
Starting and concurrence powers have diffused across branch boundaries and 
from within to outside government. By examining the taxonomy of agenda 
control mechanisms developed in Part II.E, moreover, a logic of success and 
failure emerges. Generally speaking, endogenous starting powers work all too 
well, whereas external starting powers founder. Concurrence rules, whether 
endogenous or external, have mixed success. Moreover, starting authority has 
migrated away from the House of Representatives and from Congress more 
generally toward the executive. On the other hand, the federal courts in general—
and the Supreme Court in particular—have wrestled away a large measure of 
starting authority in relation to the range of issues to be settled through judicial 
review on either constitutional or statutory grounds. While hardly powerless, 
therefore, Congress no longer occupies the axial position the Framers envisaged.  
 
This Part documents those changes and evaluates their consequences. I 
identify two movements of agenda-control authority, the first from Congress to 
the executive and the second from Congress to the federal courts (and the 
Supreme Court in particular). These transfers of agenda-control authority, I 
suggest, are better understood as evidence of salutary institutional adaption in the 
teeth of continuing challenges than as infidelities to an original institutional 
dispensation. Although each shift of agenda setting power has subtle 
distributional consequences, none wants for rational justification.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
three recent instances of randomization in government. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in 
Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2009). None of these examples concern agenda-
setting problems. 
202 The role of the European Commission in setting the agenda for Europe-wide law-making is 
another example. See George Tsebelis, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional 
Agenda Setter, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 128 (1994). 
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A. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the 
Executive   
 
The trajectory of Congress-executive branch relations can be reframed as 
an erosion of the original constitutional allocation of agenda-control authority 
across several domains, including regulatory matters, fiscal decisions, and veto 
overrides. Judicial efforts to prevent this shift have been erratic and ineffectual in 
promoting any coherent vision of legislative process.  
1. Congress and the Nation’s Regulatory Agenda 
Congress no longer has a monopoly on the nation’s regulatory agenda. It 
is common knowledge that the nondelegation doctrine lies in desuetude both in 
the courts and practical political life. 203  Its demise is exemplified by 
administrative agencies’ recent efforts to deploy old statutes “deliberately and 
strategically” to address policy problems that did not exist at the moment the 
statute was initially enacted,204 a capacity aided by courts’ deference to agency 
expertise as a means “to soften statutory rigidities or to adapt their terms to 
unanticipated conditions.”205 In effect, these practices blunt legislators’ ability to 
determine which social problems warrant political attention, and which do not. 
Symptomatic of the erosion of congressional agenda control in the regulatory 
sphere is the reflex, increasingly evinced both by courts and commentators, of 
justifying exercises of regulatory power as democratic by dint of the president’s, 
rather than Congress’s, democratic imprimatur.206 That is, independent law-
making by the executive is now vindicated with a normative theory of democracy 
at variance with the theory implied in Article I.  
Outside the ordinary regulatory sphere, Congress’s other regulatory 
powers have similarly withered on the vine. Consider the powers to make war, 
create international obligations, and define crimes. In each domain, Congress has 
largely ceded agenda-setting authority to the executive. First, to near universal 
                                                            
203 Lawson, supra note 22, at 1243 (stating that the failure of the nondelegation rule faces “no 
serious real-world legal or political challenges”). 
204 Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2014) (giving as examples EPA's deployment of the CAA to address climate change and FERC's 
use of the FPA to modernize electricity policy). 
205 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102-03 
(1990). 
206 For judicial deployment of a presidential accountability trope in administrative law, see, e.g., 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010); Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). For the 
leading scholarly treatment, see Kagan, supra note 127, at 2332-33 (arguing that “[p}residential 
administration promotes accountability” by “enabling the public to comprehend more accurately 
the sources and nature of bureaucratic power” and “establish[ing] an electoral link between the 
public and the bureaucracy”). 
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obloquy,207 legislators have largely renounced their power to declare war, while 
also abjuring the use of fiscal powers to discipline overseas military adventures.208 
Presidential initiation of armed hostilities has become the rule, with or without a 
sudden attack, while the Declare War clause has fallen into desuetude. 209 
Symptomatic of this trend, the Declare War Clause has been invoked only five 
times in American history.210 War-making, in important ways, is a prerogative of 
the executive branch.211 Second, in the international domain, it is increasingly 
common for the president to enter into so-called executive agreements, lacking 
any congressional imprimatur, in lieu of treaties. 212  One commentator has 
observed that between 1980 and 2000, the United States made 2744 
congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties.213 The president can 
also, by signing a treaty, encumber the United States with international 
obligations even if the prospect of Senate ratification is dim.214 Finally, although 
formally the first-mover in the definition of federal criminal law, in practice, 
Congress is better viewed as responsive to executive-branch needs. Congress is 
heavily and asymmetrically lobbied by the Department of Justice.215 It has 
enacted a network of federal criminal laws that delegate effectual policymaking 
authority to prosecutors via “laws with punishments greater than the facts of the 
offense would demand,” that “allow prosecutors to use the excessive punishments 
as bargaining chips.”216 The perhaps ironic resemblance between the freewheeling 
                                                            
207 The original, and still, the best critique is JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 47-54 (1993). 
208 Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 135, at 476. 
209 This has long been recognized. See Berger, supra note 134, at 58-59. 
210 Jennifer K. Elsea & Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31133, Declarations of 
War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal 
Implications 4-5 (2007) (listing the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846, the Spanish American 
War of 1898, World War I declared in 1917, and World War II). 
211 At the time of this writing, this dynamic was playing out in respect to the conflict against the 
Islamic State in Syria. See Manu Raju & Burgess Everett, War Authorization in Trouble on Hill, 
POLITICO, March 5, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/no-clear-way-forward-isil-war-
authorization-115773.html.  
212 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed. 1996) 
(describing such agreements as a “complete alternative” to treaties). Henkin here understates the 
degree of longstanding resistance of congressional-executive agreements. See, e.g., Edwin 
Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements--A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 616 (1945). 
213 Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking 
in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258-60 (2008). 
214 David H. Moore, The President's Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 604-
13 (2012) (explaining why, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
signature of treaties incurs significant consequences even absent ratification).  
215 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional 
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587-88 (2002) (describing the Justice Department as the only 
“regular player” lobbying congressional staff on criminal justice policy); accord Rachel E. 
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (“No other group comes close 
to prosecutorial lobbying efforts on crime issues.”). 
216 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880 (2009). 
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days of the federal common law of crime217 and today’s open-ended statutory 
delegations of criminalization only underscores the failure of Congress’s notional 
starting power.  
Ironically, even as Congress has otherwise ceded regulatory agenda-
setting power, the dykes to legislative action erected by the concurrence rules of 
bicameralism and presentment have proved remarkably effective at precluding 
formal legislative action.218 The high transaction costs of legislative action render 
the low transaction costs of executive branch action all the more salient and 
alluring.219 This has led presidents to refine their constitutional instruments of 
policymaking. The appointments power, for example, effectively vests presidents 
with continuing influence over the policy agenda.220 There is some empirical 
uncertainty about the magnitude of this effect.221 A threshold reason for this 
uncertainty is the observed historical variance in senatorial resistance to 
presidential nominations.222 There is also some theoretical reason to suspect that 
the effect of presidential appointive authority will be weaker than might appear at 
first blush. To be sure, presidents have unfettered authority to pick candidates to 
advance to the Senate, and can deploy their recess appointment power in the teeth 
of senatorial opposition.223 (Executive branch lawyers, moreover, had crafted a 
“broad construction” of the recess appointment power as early as the 1840s,224 
                                                            
217 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 85 to 91. 
219 Freeman & Spence, supra note 204, at 8-17. 
220 Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1571, 1606 (2015) [hereinafter “Mendelsohn, Uncertain Effects”] (assuming 
presidential incentives to make appointments in order to influence the content of substantive 
policies); accord Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive 
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 250. But see David E. Lewis, The Personnel Process in the 
Modern Presidency, 42 PRES. STUD. Q. 577, 584 (2012) (discussing the administration's incentive 
to “reward campaign personnel, surrogates, and donors with jobs”). Similar considerations may 
infuse notionally merit-based civil service hiring to which Article II does not apply. David E. 
Lewis & Richard W. Waterman, The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of 
Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-11, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 35, 51 (2013) (presenting 
evidence of presidential influence on agency staff level--noncareer SES or what are known as 
Schedule C appointees); accord Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and 
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 610-11 (2003). 
221 For an optimistic view of that power’s scope, focusing on the Reagan presidency, see Terry M. 
Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 235, 235 (John 
E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989). 
222 Resistance often takes the form of delay. See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and 
Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
1122, 1136-41(1999) (quantifying delays over time). 
223 Indeed, Corley finds that presidents are most likely to invoke the recess appointment power 
when they face large opposition in the Senate, and when they have a reserve of political capital. 
Corley, supra note 148, at 677. 
224 Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Construction and Departmentalism: A Case Study of the 
Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 441 (2010). 
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albeit one that received judicial blessing only in 2014.225). The Senate, however, 
has been increasingly demurring to move appointees forward, leading to a 
growing catalog of vacancies.226 That is, just as in other sequential, multi-stage 
decisional processes, the advantage that accrues to the possessor of exclusive 
proposal power is cabined when subsequent veto players are willing to pay the 
political price of blocking action. Further, recent research identifies a relatively 
short tenure of most Senate-confirmed officials, which implies that they are 
unlikely to initiate, or see to completion, major policy initiatives.227 On the other 
hand, the number of administrative positions subject to Senate confirmation has 
seen a recent “staggering” uptick.228  
The net effect of these cross-cutting trends on the magnitude of 
presidential post-enactment control via the appointments power is hard to 
quantify. Adding to the complexity of the analysis, any evaluation of ex post 
presidential control over regulatory policy would also have to account for non-
constitutional instruments of regulatory control, such as centralized White House 
regulatory review, as well as potentially severe epistemic constraints upon 
congressional oversight.229 Nevertheless, it remains safe to say that the president’s 
appointment power—just like bicameralism and the veto—still operates as a 
potent downstream device for agenda control. The magnitude of its effect—
although uncertain—directly determines presidential authority over regulatory 
agendas. The larger such power, the less important is the threshold specification 
of regulatory policy by Congress via the exercise of bicameralism and 
presentment.   
2. Congress and the Fiscal Agenda  
At first blush, it would seem that constitutional starting rules are especially 
significant allocations of decisional authority between constitutional actors in 
respect to fiscal matters. The Origination Clause seems to imply that if the House 
                                                            
225 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
226 Anne Joseph O'Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster 
Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 
1645, 1677 (2015) (documenting recent increases in the duration of vacancies). 
227 Mendelsohn, Uncertain Effects, supra note 220, at 1595-96 (arguing that “political supervision 
of significant regulatory activity is mainly reactive, not proactive. Midlevel Senate-confirmed 
political officials may not be responsible for many significant new affirmative agenda items”). 
The mean term of office of a Senate confirmed official is less than three years. Anne Joseph 
O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 919 
n.23 (2009). 
228 Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Appointments Process and the Administrative 
Presidency, 39 PRES. STUD. Q. 38, 41, 48-49 (2009). 
229 For example, congressional efforts to oversee administrative agencies are limited by 
legislators’ limited epistemic competence, and the relative expertise of agency officials. Terry M. 
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (2006). If epistemic 
constraints are large, an ineffectual appointments power may be somewhat irrelevant.  
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wishes to resist the Senate’s initiatives, it can simply refuse to propose a fiscal 
measure in the first instance. The power to hold-up the legislative process by 
refusing to start the ball rolling would seem to imply a disproportionate power on 
the House side. Consistent with this view, Adrian Vermeule has argued that the 
Origination Clause vests the House with “an intangible but real form of first-
mover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda in ways that structure 
both legislative and political debate.”230 The leading empirical study of the effect 
of origination clauses in state constitutions suggests that this design choice 
produces outcomes closer to the preferences of the median legislator in the 
originating chamber (which may or may not be evidence that chamber’s 
influence, as opposed to a stabilizing effect).231  
For several reasons, however, it is not clear that the federal Origination 
Clause has had, or even could have, the biasing effect in favor of the House that 
the Framers anticipated. First, as a matter of theory, it is not the case that the first 
option presented to a group of decision-makers engaged in serial votes over a 
matter will be advantaged because of the possibility of strategic voting to defeat 
the earlier proposal.232 An agenda setter might instead seek to leverage the 
epistemic effects of timing with a later proposal: because the latter allow for less 
time for participants to learn about the proposal’s consequences, opponents of the 
measure may have less time to develop empirical or theoretical counterarguments. 
The asymmetric distribution of opportunities for learning, in short, can be used to 
advantage a later option.233    
A second reason for doubting the efficacy of the Origination Clause turns 
on the longstanding practice among designers of procedural rules for collective 
bodies of disfavoring earlier slots in a decisional process, which tend to be 
allocated to less popular proposals. One example is found in the standard rules of 
legislative procedure. Discussing the process of filling blanks in legislative 
schemes,234 Roberts’ Rules of Order states not only that “members have an 
opportunity to weigh all choices before voting” but that entries be arranged such 
                                                            
230 Vermeule, supra note 11, at 424; id. at 425 (arguing “the House’s ability to demand a payment 
for the renunciation of its origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the 
distribution of political benefits between the House and the Senate in the House’s favor”). For a 
formal model that predicts that bicameral chambers will endogenously sequence themselves to 
take advantage of comparative epistemic advantages, see James R. Rogers, Bicameral Sequence: 
Theory and State Legislative Evidence, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1025, 1025 (1998).  
231 James R. Rogers, Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures, 30 
LEG. STUD. Q. 29, 39 (2005) [hereinafter “Rogers, Empirical Determinants”] (reporting a 
statistically significant effect in the 40 percent of states that have an origination clause).  
232 See Levmore, Bicameralism, supra note 83, at 147. Claims about the House’s agenda-setting 
power also fail to account for the now-prevalent Conference Committee process. Id. at 149. 
233 Of course, there is also less time to learn of a later proposal’s benefits. But an agenda setter can 
prepare offset this by gathering information before introducing the proposal.  
234 For instance, by assigning appropriated amounts to different tasks envisaged by a law. 
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that “the one least likely to be acceptable will be voted on first.”235 This concern 
resonates in congressional practice. Exemplifying the weakness of the House’s 
power under the Origination Clause, the Senate has developed a practice of 
striking the text of a House bill entirely and then replacing it with a wholly new 
revenue-raising text.236 A recent scholarly treatment of the Origination Clause 
observes that this maneuver was anticipated amongst the drafters of the 
Constitution at Philadelphia.237 In short, from the Constitution’s inception, it may 
well have been anticipated that the inter-cameral distributive effect of the 
Origination Clause would be weak to non-existent.238 To the extent that the voting 
public uses the Clause as a guide to facilitate retrospective voting on fiscal 
matters, therefore, the Clause may well mislead more than it informs.  
Finally, empirical evidence that the Origination Clause’s allocation of 
starting power has empowered the more numerous chamber is also elusive. 
Rather, congressional budgeting reforms enacted in the wake of the early 1970s 
impoundment crisis239 have instead empowered the leadership of the two political 
parties. The latter exercise effectual agenda-setting power by selecting and then 
maintaining tight control over the membership of congressional committees 
responsible for setting the concurrent budgetary resolution.240 Budgetary agenda 
setting, in short, is not only external, but in the hands of a nonstate actor. 
                                                            
235 H. ROBERTS, ROBERTS’S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED 136-28 (1970). 
236 Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 661 & n.6 (listing examples). 
237 Id. at 691. 
238 It is not clear whether the finding that state-level origination clause lead to outcomes closer to 
the median preferences of the proposing chamber are to be the contrary. See Rogers, Empirical 
Determinants, supra note 231, at 39. If that finding extends to the federal level—which is 
doubtful—it would show the Origination Clause shifts power between appropriation committees 
in the House and the median floor voter in the House. That is, absent origination, it would be 
expected that committees, which play a gatekeeping role, would have a disproportionate influence 
on the shape of legislative proposals. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 758 (2005) [hereinafter “Garrett, Framework Legislation”] 
(discussing the role of “gatekeeping” appropriations committees on fiscal matters). With 
origination, those committees lose power—which is consistent with the intuition that a starting 
power is less important than first seems. See supra Part III.B.  
239 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 310(c), 88 Stat. 297, 315 (1974). 
The preeminent statutory budgetary framework before 1974 directed the president to submit an 
annual budget. See 67 Pub. L. No. 13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921); see also Tim Westmoreland, Standard 
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1559-64 (2007) (summarizing 
history of federal budgeting process). 
240 Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 714-16 (2000). Garrett further notes that “negotiations concerning the 
concurrent budget resolutions have actually occurred between party leaders outside the forum of 
the committees.” Id. at 718. 
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3. The Presidential Veto Override   
The substantive effects of concurrence rules in the veto-override context 
are more difficult to discern, in part because of an absence of empirical work on 
the topic.241 Unlike the Origination context, the first mover in a veto override has 
no framing power: a bill’s contents are identical during final passage and veto 
override votes.242 In addition, it is the “rare” case in which a veto occurs (in two 
percent of cases), and the even scarcer case that Congress decides to override that 
veto (about forty-five percent after a non-pocket veto). 243  As a result, the 
embedded starting rule and concurrent requirement within the veto override are 
unlikely to be anticipated by participations in the regular enactment process.  
At the same time, overrides are no mere formalism. They rather appear to 
be surprisingly contested votes, with about 1 in 10 legislators who voted on the 
final version of an enrolled bill switching sides either for or against the 
president.244 Patterns of vote switching seem to be explained by ideological 
affinity with (or distance from) the president as well as a member’s length of 
service on Capitol Hill.245 Neither of these factors cast light on the effect of the 
override regime. To the contrary, they suggest that there is no informational 
justification for the starting rule, since members already have the information 
necessary to make a judgment about ideological affinities and tenure in 
Congress.246 Perhaps the best that can be said in defense of the starting rule is that 
it might be weakly justified as a means of clarifying political accountability. In 
those rare cases that Congress decided to reject the President’s considered veto 
decision—an action perhaps founded on constitutional objections to legislation—
the Framers may have believed it was important to pick out in the constitutional 
text which of the two Houses took the lead. Of course, given the need for both 
Houses’ consent to an override (i.e., an embedded concurrence rule), and the 
possibility that voters are more attentive to the news-engendering second and final 
                                                            
241 David Bridge, Presidential Power Denied: A New Model of Veto Overrides Using Political 
Times, 41 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 149, 150 (2014) (“[T]he literature is almost silent about 
the factors influencing the override of presidential vetoes.”).  
242 Patrick T. Hickey, Beyond Pivotal Politics: Constituencies, Electoral Imperatives, and Veto 
Override Attempts in the House, 44 PRES. STUD. Q. 577, 577 (2014).  
243 CAMERON, supra note 77, at 46 (finding that 2.3% of bills passed by both Houses between 1945 
and 1992 were vetoed). 
244 KREHBIEL, supra note 78, at 123 (Table 6.2, row 3); Hickey, supra note 242, at 581 (finding 
that 11.3 percent of House members switched votes from final passage to override). To the best 
that I can tell, there is no empirical study of veto overrides that distinguishes vote switching in the 
first and the second chambers to cast votes.  
245 See Hickey, supra note 242, at 591-93 (reporting results from a study of veto overrides between 
1973 and 2011); see also Richard S. Conley & Amie Kreppel, Toward a New Typology of Vetoes 
and Overrides, 54 POL. RES. Q. 831, 833 (2001) (analyzing the composition of three different 
kinds of override coalitions). 
246 For a similar point, see Conley & Kreppel, supra note 245, at 832 (characterizing override 
votes as a rare “complete information” environment in Congress).  
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vote, it is quite possible that this accountability justification is frail in practice. If 
that is so, the lesson of the veto override provision may be that the Framers 
occasionally deployed agenda control instruments for no clear purpose.  
4. Judicial Efforts to Buttress Congressional Agenda-Setting Power  
To the extent that the Court has resisted these trends, its efforts have been 
quixotic and without plainly beneficial effect. The Court has resisted extra-textual 
supplements to the legislative process in the form of the legislative veto, the line-
item veto, and automatic fiscal adjustments.247 But none of these additional veto-
gates would necessarily compromise the stabilizing function of Article I, Section 
7, nor undermine its status-quo-protective effect (to the extent that is even 
desirable). Rather, the effect of additional veto-gates would be merely to change 
the interbranch distribution of rents from the legislative process. Bargaining 
would continue within the space established by the bounds set by constitutional 
veto players, with the ultimate outcome moving to reflect the different balance of 
power between different participants.  
For example, the line-item veto when enacted at the state level generates a 
pattern of fiscal outcomes that are somewhat more favorable for the president’s 
party, without changing overall levels of deficit spending. 248  Although the 
legislative deal reached in specific cases might differ, the domain of possible 
legislative outcomes would—social theory predicts—remains constant. The 
separation of powers, of course, does not entitle legislative or executive actors to 
specific victories or particular outcomes. Indeed, it is likely that abolition of the 
legislative veto, the line-item veto, and the lockbox mechanism each analogously 
scrambled the distribution of rents from legislative bargaining—but not in any 
stable way. Provided that the range of expected legislative outcomes remains 
unchanged, however, it is hard to see why this distributive effect is significant, 
and, correspondingly, hard to see any constitutional reason to read Article I, 
Section 7 as exclusive. The line-item veto, the legislative veto, and the lockbox 
mechanism are more consistent with the constitutional design than the Court’s 
pinched attention to text suggests.249   
                                                            
247 See supra text accompanying notes 92 to 96 (discussing cases). 
248 For example, Stearns theorized that the dynamic effect of an item veto would be “simply to 
change the players in that process” of bargaining. Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case 
Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 417 (1992). Empirical studies suggest it has 
no effect on the size of the budget. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The line item veto and public 
sector budgets: Evidence from the states, 36 J. PUB. ECON. 269 (1988); accord John R. Carter & 
David Schap, Line-Item Veto: Where is Thy Sting?, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (199) (formal model of 
line-item veto showing de minimus effect). 
249 There may be other normative justifications for objection to one or all of these measures. For 
example, recent work on budgetary allocations suggests that the president, even absent an item-
veto, exercises large influence. Valentino Larcinese et al., Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to 
the States: The Impact of the President, 68 J. POL. 447, 447-48 (2006) (examining interstate 
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To a certain extent, the foregoing echoes a familiar story of legislative 
decline and executive branch growth. A central difference from standard 
accounts, however, is the presence of a new causal mechanism. Explanations for 
today’s balance of power between Articles I and II, I have suggested, are not to be 
found solely in contemporary institutional and political developments such as the 
rise of the regulatory state, the demand for complex rule-making for a rapidly 
expanding national economy, or America’s post-World War II international 
hegemony. Instead, the seeds of the contemporary status quo lie deeper, buried in 
constitutional text. The powers lost by Congress and gained by the executive are 
directly and intimately linked to the agenda control devices woven into the 
constitutional fabric at the Philadelphia Convention. Whereas the devices 
assigned to the president, as well as the role of concurrence rules in impeding 
legislative impetuosity, have thrived, the devices meant to empower Congress 
have crumbled. If today’s arrangements are to be condemned, in short, it is as 
much an inculpation of original constitutional design as of post-ratification 
institutional drift.  
B. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the Court 
 
 The constitutional law of agenda control also casts light on the changing 
relationship of the federal courts to the political branches, Congress in particular. 
Recall that Part II identified two forms of agenda control regulating the issues 
presented to the judiciary: the congressional titration of federal lower court and 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction on the one hand, and standing doctrine’s 
constraint on litigant manipulation of the order in which legal issues are presented 
on the other.250 Neither of these constraints operates today as initially intended. At 
the Supreme Court level in particular, Congress has effectively delegated agenda-
setting authority to the Justices, while standing doctrine has proved too malleable 
to impede interest groups from engaging in strategic litigation.251 In practice, 
though, the main beneficiary of doctrinal ductility is the Court itself, which carves 
out exceptions for litigants and issues it disfavors while openly inviting other 
litigation. The critique of judicial activism leveled most recently by the dissenting 
Justices in Obergefell v. Hodges, 252 in other words, can be applied to the Court as 
                                                                                                                                                                  
federal budgetary expenditures, and finding that states that heavily supported the incumbent 
president in previous presidential elections tended to receive more funds, while marginal and 
swing states were not rewarded). 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 178 to 184.  
251 The following account focuses on the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court 
rather than the relationship of Congress to the lower federal courts. Below the apex tribunal, 
though, statutory jurisdictional changes often, although not always, follow cues supplied by the 
judiciary. See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 166, at 18-22 (supplying examples of 
jurisdictional change by statute that follows a judicial cue).  
252 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(accusing the Obergefell majority of staking “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-
legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government”).  
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a whole. Indeed, because those same dissenters have rank among the ideological 
majority of the Court, they have greater incentive than their liberal colleagues to 
use standing rules to sculpt both their docket and the flow of doctrine from the 
Court.253 The net result of these trends is a shift of substantive power from the 
political branches to the Court—a power distilled, most importantly, in the 
Court’s almost unfettered authority to select which issues to adjudicate.  
 
 This shift began with the pathmarking 1891 Evarts Act, which started the 
move from mandatory to discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and was packaged in 
Congress as “a politically neutral performance attempt to relieve the workload of 
the Supreme Court.”254 Subsequently, Congress’s approach to the courts reflected 
both the influence of the judiciary as a prestigious interest group255 and also a 
bipartisan interest in maintaining a tribunal able to resolve nationally contested 
disputes of constitutional moment.256 As a result, Congress has declined (with rare 
exceptions) to restrict the Court’s reach by use of its power to craft exceptions to 
its appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding its clear textual power to do so.257  
Instead, congressional exercise of its exception authority has had the effect of 
furthering the judiciary’s interests of maximizing discretion and minimizing the 
burden of unwanted adjudication. 258  In short, Congress has abandoned the 
effectual exercise of its agenda-setting power. The result is that the Court has 
gained substantially more power to determine which issues it addresses. Judicial 
control, once exogenous, is now endogenous.   
 
 Equally, Stearns’s aspirations for standing doctrine have been undermined 
by the incoherence of the injury-in-fact rule and also the willingness of Justices 
not only to use standing doctrine as a way of favoring or disfavoring litigants, but 
also to use their platform at the Court to invite new interest groups to seek review 
                                                            
253 To be clear, there is no particular reason to believe that a majority of liberal Justices would 
refrain from the same manipulation of the judicial agenda were they in authority.  
254 CROWE, supra note 169, at 184-187 (noting that certiorari had “previously [been] used only 
sparingly and only to summon the record of a case”). The Judicial Code of 1911, which abolished 
circuit riding similarly “sparked only token resistance from … legislators.” Id. at 188. 
255 Id. at 201-09. 
256 Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 
945-46 (2013) (noting how both conservatives and liberals were “were willing to support 
measures that protected the Supreme Court's settlement function”). This is a specific example of 
the more general tendency of elected actors to support judicial power as a delegation of power to 
resolve difficult national problems. See Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: 
Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005).  
257 See Fallon, supra note 170, at 1045 (2010) (“Although jurisdiction-stripping bills are 
frequently introduced in Congress, they seldom pass.”). The exception is the limitation on habeas 
corpus review invalidated in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending constitutional 
habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay detentions). 
258 Grove, supra note 256, at 931 (“Congress has made “exceptions” and “regulations” that 
facilitate the Court's role in providing a definitive and uniform resolution of federal questions.”). 
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of issues that might otherwise never reach the Court. Standing law is commonly 
condemned as “lawless, illogical, and dishonest.” 259  The injury-in-fact 
requirement, in particular, conduces to “open-ended, free-form, and near 
metaphysical inquiries into the adequacy of alleged injuries.”260 Stearns argues 
that absent the constraint imposes by standing doctrine, “the Court's nominal 
power of docket control would be largely illusory” because litigants could 
manufacture circuit splits that the Court would feel compelled to adjudicate.261  
Stearns’ prediction, however, has not been borne out in practice. Only a 
“small proportion of the nation's agenda … directly before the Supreme Court in 
particular and the courts in general.”262 There is little evidence that the Court is 
pressed against its collective will into addressing some issues and not others by 
conniving interest groups. To the contrary, the Court has retained a large measure 
of agenda control notwithstanding the inefficacy of standing doctrine for two 
reasons. First, the very fluidity of standing doctrine empowers the Justices to 
carve out favored and disfavored classes of litigants (and hence, legal issues) in 
ways that reassert judicial primacy. Both liberal and conservative Justices have 
deployed standing doctrine to close the courthouse door to disfavored litigants in 
hotly contested domains like Establishment Clause jurisprudence.263 Depending 
on their priors, the Justices are also more or less rigorous when applying the 
presumption against facial challenges, especially in structural constitutional cases, 
and also in looking for traditional indicia of harm necessary for Article III 
standing.264 And when litigants prove too reticent to press an issue that interests 
the Justices, they unheedingly introduce it themselves. The core constitutional 
question in Zivotofsky, for example, was of sufficient interest to the Justices that 
they added it a first-round certiorari petition.265 
Second, the Justices have become increasingly willing and able to use 
their opinions as platforms to signal to potential litigants which legal issues they 
                                                            
259 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 501 (2008). 
260 Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1460 (2013) 
[hereinafter “Huq, Standing”]; accord Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992). 
261 Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 177, at 329. 
262 Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda - and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 
(2006). 
263 For conservative and liberal uses of standing doctrine to disfavor litigants in the Establishment 
Clause context, see respectively Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 
(2007) (rejecting taxpayer standing for executive actions that arguably violate the Establishment 
Clause), and Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004). 
264 Huq, Standing, supra note 260, at 1443-48 (collecting cases). 
265 M.Z.B. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (order granting certiorari, but 
directing the parties to answer the additional question, “Whether Section 214 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President's power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns.”). For another example of wholesale change by the Court of the 
issue presented, see Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (mem.). 
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should present to courts. For example, in the 2014 Term, Justice Thomas issued a 
series of striking opinions in which he invited litigants to challenge basic tenets of 
the regulatory state on originalist grounds.266 None of these concurrences were 
strictly necessary to the resolution of a case at hand, even on Justice Thomas’s 
own logic. All comprised dicta plainly aimed at influencing the behavior of future 
litigants. (As an aside, all also make a mockery of pretenses of judicial restraint or 
modesty). On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Justice Breyer exploited 
an Eighth Amendment challenge to a method of execution to invite 
reconsideration of the death penalty tort court.267  Both liberal and conservative 
Justices, moreover, have also been willing to exploit opinions dissenting from the 
denial of a certiorari petition as a means to signal their interest in future 
litigation.268 By signaling issues of potential interest, teasing flexibility from 
justiciability doctrine, and adding issues to certiorari petitions as necessary, the 
Justices obtain a large measure of discretion over the contents of their appellate 
docket, amplifying the endogenous agenda control vested by statute from 1891 
onwards.  
In his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief Justice Roberts bemoaned the 
majority’s willingness to “seize[e] for itself a question the Constitution leaves to 
the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that 
question.”269 It is no great feat to parry Chief Justice Roberts with a tu quoque.270 
But trading allegations of judicial overreach hardly edifies: the more important 
point is that the power to pluck issues from the public agenda is deeply woven 
into the current constitutional matrix for judicial power. It is the shift from 
exogenous to endogenous agenda control that lies behind the Court’s 
extraordinary rise in prestige and national prominence—a shift that liberals and 
conservatives alike have exploited and decried in almost equal measure.   
                                                            
266 See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (noting “doubts about the 
legitimacy of this Court's precedents concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Natural Gas Act,” 
and in effect flagging the issue for future challenge); Dep’t of Transp’n v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 
135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-41 (2015) (calling into question the permissible scope of legislative 
guidance and purporting to “identify principles relevant to today's dispute, with an eye to offering 
guidance to the lower courts on remand”); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 
1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling into question “the legitimacy of our 
precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations,” including Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)). 
267 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would ask for full 
briefing on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.”). 
268 Rapelje v. Blackston, 136 S. Ct. 388 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); 
Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
269 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
270 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the coverage 
formula of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 2008). 
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C. Evaluating the Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control 
 
The standard story of how federal governance changed across the 
twentieth century focuses on the erosion of limits on congressional power, to the 
detriment of both the states and individuals’ interests,271 and the accretion of 
power by the executive branch.272 It thus seeks to explain institutional change as a 
process of unraveling boundaries on institutional power.   
 
My central aim in this Part has been to identify the constitutional law of 
agenda control as another important but underappreciated important site of 
constitutional conflict and transformation. To be sure, this alternative account has 
continuities with the standard story of how the federal government has changed 
over time. The demise of the nondelegation doctrine, for example, continues to 
play a central role in both explanations of shifting configurations of government 
power.273 Nevertheless, I suggest that the constitutional law of agenda control has 
been an analytically distinct site of change to the interbranch balance of power 
across the twentieth century. To understand the increasingly robust authority of 
the executive and the judiciary alike, as well as the impoverishment of the 
legislative power, it is necessary to account for the legal assignment of agenda 
control as well as changing institutional capacities and positive law-making 
powers. Standard accounts that focus on bureaucratic personnel or on external 
legal constraints alone, by contrast, fail to tell the whole story. 
 
The role that shifting agenda control has played in constitutional history 
further raises a normative question: What should we make of this erosion of a 
seemingly central element of constitutional design? And while it seems highly 
unlikely that courts, wielding the power of constitutional review, could undo the 
concatenated institutional changes described in this Part—doing so, after all 
would unwind much of their own power to identify and resolve constitutional 
issues—should courts invalidate new changes to the division of agenda-setting 
power between the branches? In part, the answers to these questions are 
                                                            
271 A leading statement of this view is Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REG. 
84, 84 (1995). For reiterations from different parts of the political spectrum, see, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is 
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 637 (2010) (decrying the possibility of limitless 
congressional regulatory power); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857 n.255 (1995) (“[Wickard] construed Congress's commerce powers as 
virtually unlimited ....”). 
272 Tom C.W. Lin, Ceos and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1375 (2014) (noting how 
“the President's powers have … expanded dramatically” with rise of the regulatory state); William 
P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 505, 514 (2008) (same). 
273 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 22, at 1243 (decrying the decline of the nondelegation doctrine); 
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2002) (noting that 
“more than half a century of case law by unanimously declar[es] the nondelegation doctrine to be 
effectively a dead letter”).  
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contingent on large, unresolved questions of constitutional theory. Originalists, 
for example, will offer different analyses from consequentialist scholars. Without 
offering a complete theory of constitutional interpretation, some tentative 
normative conclusions can be offered here. 
 
The constitutional law of agenda control is part of what I have elsewhere 
called the negotiated structural constitution.274 The institutional balance of power 
over agenda-control shifted in part because the Framers’ selection of agenda 
setting mechanisms was not always successful: some of their design choices 
misfired, when others succeeded rather too well. As a result, branches vested with 
an agenda-control power that they could not effectively deploy found it beneficial 
to assign that power to a coordinate branch. Generally, this involved Congress 
legislating away its agenda-setting authority to either the executive branch or 
Congress. At the same time, branches capable of effectively wielding an agenda 
setting authority have wielded it to the exclusion of other branches. Institutional 
success in the use of some powers, in other words, engenders confidence to make 
broader claims to competence, which in turn are accepted or even ratified by other 
branches. On a very superficial view, this is a simple story of constitutional 
failure. The original dispensation and the primacy of Congress therein have 
collapsed. Its rectification would entail massive transfers of authority between the 
branches to recreate the primordial institutional status quo. Consistent with this 
view, Justice Thomas has recently proposed several radical changes to the law, 
including a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine, a limit to agency adjudication, 
and a rollback of judicial deference to agencies’ constructions of both organic 
statutes and their own regulations.275  
 
Although Justice Thomas’s arguments, and the originalist account that 
underpins them, have obvious continuing appeal to many, they are not the only 
way to gloss changes to the constitutional law of agenda control. In earlier work, I 
have argued that the Constitution need not be read to assign immutable 
obligations to specific institutions. 276  Rather, the Constitution provisionally 
assigns regulatory entitlements to different branches as a threshold matter. Just 
like individuals, each branch can waive or transfer its exercise of an institutional 
interest either because it receives something of benefit in return, or because it 
perceives the other branch as better suited to carrying out a given function. In 
military and foreign affairs matters, for example, Congress has ceded turf to the 
executive in part because it benefits by avoiding hard foreign-policy decisions, 
and in part because it views the executive branch as better positioned to make 
                                                            
274 Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra note 21, at 1568. 
275 For citations to the relevant cases, see supra note 10; see also Brian Lipshutz, Justice Thomas 
and the Originalist Turn in Administrative Law, 125 YALE L .J. F.94 (2015) (describing these 
opinions as a “sustained originalist critique of administrative law”). 
276 See Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra note 21, at 1620-23.  
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such decisions.277  The recognition of such negotiated interbranch arrangements 
are, I have argued, generally consistent with the Constitution’s ambition of 
effective governance, welfare-enhancing, and generally superior to any 
dispensation a court would reach through standard constitutional interpretation. It 
is also consonant with the growing recognition that an important element of our 
constitutional law comprises the “glosses” that institutional actors offer on the 
document’s text through their own efforts to deploy the constitution as a working 
tool of government under fluctuating social and political circumstances.278 To 
recognize the products of institutional negotiation over agenda-control 
entitlements is not merely an act of realpolitik—a concession of the judiciary’s 
necessary frailty in the teeth of determined political opposition—but a Burkean 
recognition of the accumulated wisdom of many generations of Americans’ 
largely good-faith efforts to implement the Constitution.   
 
Accordingly, I have argued, such bargained-for restructuring of 
institutional parameters should be seen as generally desirable evidence of a 
constitutional order that is adapting and evolving to fulfill the Framers’ larger 
ambition of sound governance. The collapse of constitutional agenda control 
mechanisms that is analyzed in this Part fits neatly within this account of a 
negotiated structural constitution. By and large, agenda control powers have 
shifted to the institution most capable and willing to use them. At the same time, 
Congress has retained a plethora of budgetary, regulatory, and rhetorical tools—as 
well as its powerful ability to block changes to the status quo—that it ensures it 
can play a role when it sees fit to do so. As a result, the constitutional values of 
democratic accountability, efficient government, and liberty-promotion do not 
seem obviously offended by the constitutional law of agenda control that I have 
described.    
 
Instead, it is important to recognize, the main effect of constitutional 
agenda control’s erosion is distributive. Rule-making, whether through 
legislation, administrative regulation, or judicial precedent, creates winners and 
losers. Changing the allocation of agenda-control likely results in a different 
outcome, and hence a different pattern of gains and losses in given case. But it is 
not clear that the fact that a shift in agenda control influences who loses and who 
wins in regulatory battles should have constitutional salience. To be sure, the 
House’s loss of control over the budget, the president’s greater power to initiate 
regulatory initiatives, and the court’s power to set the constitutional agenda all 
mean that the interest groups that prevail in the political process in a given case 
are not those that would prevail under a pinched reading of the Constitution’s text. 
But the fact that winners and losers switch places in a single case is not of clear 
constitutional salience. Over the long term, the flow of benefits and burdens from 
                                                            
277 Id. at 1624-65 (discussing foreign affairs context). 
278 See Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417-24 (2012). 
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the modified constitutional dispensation is hardly predictable. Moreover, it is not 
plainly distinct from the long-term distributive patterns generated by rejecting 
changes to the constitutional law of agenda control.    
 
To see this more clearly, consider a recent proposal to construe Article II 
to allow presidents to make agency appointments when the Senate fails to act on 
his proposed candidates.279  In effect, this moves the influence over regulatory 
agendas currently embodied in the appointments process wholly over to the 
presidency.  Such a change to the law would certainly “alter the bargaining game 
between the President and the Senate,” in the sense that the size and composition 
of the successful nomination pool would change.280 The distribution of regulatory 
winners and losers would accordingly likely change. But it is quite plausible to 
think that the change would have no negative systemic effects, but would instead 
eliminate the nonconstitutional power of Senate minority factions to extract 
exorbitant political rents.281 These factions would lose out, but they might well 
adapt by striving harder to obtain the presidency. Or they might turn to the courts. 
In the long term, therefore, the distributive effects of changing the constitutional 
law of agenda control are uncertain. Factions and interest groups adapt. With 
electoral cycle, congressional losers become in time White House winners. The 
systemic effects of this single shift in agenda control in contrast are largely 
positive or at best neutral, even if the distributional effects in given instances vary 
considerably.  
 
The same analysis can be extended, mutatis mutandi, more generally to 
historical changes to the constitutional law of agenda control. The large shift of 
budgetary authority away from the House and from the legislature likely has 
yielded quite different patterns of fiscal winners and losers in discrete cases. But 
that alone does not make it suspect. A more robust account of the president’s 
recess appointment clause means regulatory missions endorsed by a historical 
Congress but disfavored by a contemporary Congress are more likely to advance. 
But it is not clear that there is any constitutional reason for concern as a result. 
The movement of war and foreign affairs powers away from Congress also results 
in a different array of overseas entanglements. Whether that difference is 
constitutionally salient is hard to say: Consequentialist analysis likely turns 
entirely on one’s views about the merits of specific deployments and international 
agreements. The Supreme Court’s functional hegemony over the path of 
constitutional adjudication has doubtless altered the mix of disputes and resulting 
precedent in comparison to a status quo of greater departmentalism. Again, it is 
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hardly plain that this movement can be characterized as positive or negative 
without an implicit theory of constitutional interpretation, and a judgment of 
whether the Court or the political branches has gotten more questions correct.  
 
One worry, nevertheless, is worth identifying as worthy of more extended 
consideration. A potential normative concern raised by the changes mapped in 
this Part turns on the gradual disempowerment of Congress, which has 
increasingly lost control of the national policy agenda over time.282 At the same 
time, there has been a shift of discretionary policy-making authority to both the 
executive and the federal courts.283 On this view, the accumulated weight of 
changes to the constitutional law of agenda control rises to the level of 
constitutional concern because of the imbalance between the branches that has 
ensued. Even if individual changes to agenda control, therefore, were negotiated, 
their net effect has been an unhealthy emasculation of what the Framers 
anticipated would be the most dangerous branch. On this view, for example, the 
Court’s broad construction of the recess appointment power in NLRB v. Noel 
Canning is problematic.284 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rested narrowly on a 
reading of the “Clause's purpose [that] demands the broader interpretation,”285 one 
that emphasized the risk of vacancies in senior agency positions. 286  This 
“functionalist” argument, however, does not account for overall trends in the 
constitutional law of agenda control. It arguably risks further tilting an interbranch 
relationship that is already comprehensively asymmetrical.  
 
A determination of whether Congress has lost ‘too much’ power 
implicates hard questions of democratic and constitutional theory. It is far from 
clear, to my mind, that a worry about constitutional imbalance against Congress is 
well-justified. To begin with, the asymmetry between the executive and Congress 
might depend primarily on the sheer size of the regulatory and military state at the 
president’s putative command, and on the marked difference in collective 
institutional action. Law in general, and the constitutional law of agenda-control 
in particular might have only an inframarginal effect. Even if law’s effect is 
significant, moreover, the notion of a balance between the branches rests on 
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notoriously fragile intellectual premises.287 Further, as a host of empirical studies 
show, the policy effects of separated powers are ambiguous, even at the level of 
cross-national studies.288 Even discounting the local observation that Congress 
these days does not seem incapable of throwing its weight around,289 there are 
compelling reasons to think that alarms about constitutional imbalance are not yet 
warranted. Instead, complaints of imbalance await a convincing theoretical and 
empirical underpinning to render them plausible grounds for complaint about the 




This Article has developed a new vocabulary for the analysis of 
constitutional problems. It has demonstrated that divergent forms of agenda 
control are embedded in the Constitution’s text and the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Focusing on the separation of powers, I have aimed to demonstrate that agenda 
control measures can have the effect of partitioning, dispersing, or concentrating 
state power. Future analyses of the Constitution’s function and consequences, to 
say nothing of historical constitutional change, should account for the law of 
agenda control and the way it has channeled, enabled, and blocked exercises of 
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